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As a result of the changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific, Japan is shifting 
to a more proactive defense policy, as outlined in the National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG). This thesis investigates the challenges faced by Japan’s industry, 
government, and society in meeting the NDPG objectives. To do this, this thesis probes 
the following problem areas: difficulties with indigenous production of weapons systems, 
inability to procure and market advanced technologies, inefficient management and 
policies on the part of bureaucracy, budget shortfalls, industries’ ideological opposition, 
geopolitical risks, antimilitaristic roots of pacifism, and personnel/operational readiness 
of the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Japan’s government manages one of the most 
efficient democracies in the world and its Self-Defense Force is an advanced professional 
organization. Despite these strengths, this thesis finds that these problems and obstacles 
will delay––but not prevent––Japan’s ability to achieve the NDPG objectives. Based on 
the findings, this thesis concludes that the following strategies will give Japan the best 
chance to work around the obstacles: strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, marketing 
technologies in which Japan has a comparative advantage, and applying bureaucratic 
reforms that improve collaboration with outside agencies. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
As a result of the changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific, particularly 
North Korea’s continued provocations and China’s growing military capability, Japan 
plans to build a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” and “build a comprehensive defense 
architecture and strengthen its system for preventing and responding to various 
contingencies,”
 
as outlined in its recent National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).1
 
These security guidelines were designed to help Japan navigate the unique challenges of 
the 21st century. They call for a modern world-class military that is flexible, adaptive, 
and abides by the principle of a “proactive contribution to peace.”2 The rules seek to 
establish a more offensive-oriented posture and a stronger role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Japan’s defense policy reached a milestone in 2014 with a constitutional reinterpretation 
that legalizes Collective Self-Defense (CSD). It refers to the right of all UN countries to 
use military force to defend other member nations from attack. This latest plan represents 
an unprecedented level of commitment to national security. 
To meet the NDPG, Japan must rapidly revamp its defense capabilities, which 
raises the question of whether its industrial sector and government organizations are up to 
the task. Do they currently possess the capacity and capability to deliver on these bold 
objectives? What domestic and international obstacles stand in their way? This thesis 
assesses these questions by examining the problems, challenges, and potential shortfalls 
that Japan’s defense industries and government institutions might face. It investigates its 
major organizational/operational deficiencies, as well as other political factors hindering 
its goal of strengthening national defense. These problems include the difficulties with 
indigenous production of weapons systems (kokusanka), inability to procure and market 
advanced technologies, inefficient management and policies on the part of the 
bureaucracy, budget shortfalls, industries’ ideological opposition (or anticipation of 
                                                 
1 “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond,” Government of Japan, December 
17, 2013, 5, 7, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
public opposition), geopolitical risks, antimilitaristic roots of pacifism, and, finally, 
personnel/operational readiness within the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Finally, this 
thesis explores the required reforms, potential solutions, and strategies that Japan can 
implement to mitigate the problems. These include cultural reform within the ministries 
to ease collaboration with non-government organizations, marketing of Japan’s unique 
component technology, maintaining a robust space program, and strengthening the 
alliance with the U.S. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Current threats to Japan’s national security are arguably at their highest levels 
since World War II. Despite condemnation from the international community, North 
Korea continues to advance its nuclear program, inching closer to acquiring both a long-
range missile delivery system and a miniaturized warhead, while increasing the frequency 
of its missile tests near Japanese waters. Meanwhile, China’s rapid military growth, 
particularly its militarization of the South China Sea and continued territorial 
confrontations, present dangerous scenarios for Japan. The 2013 NDPG was written in 
response to these potential threats, among others, with plans to reform Japan’s defenses.  
Japan’s ability to strengthen its defenses ultimately hinges on the joint capacity 
and will of its defense industry and government organizations. As Sugai states, “some 
new industries in Japan will enter the defense field by utilizing their advanced IT, 
component technology, and dual-use technology. There can be tremendous possibilities 
when Japan’s huge technical firms join the world defense market.”3 But by many 
indications, these institutions are currently not in a position to support Japan’s goal of 
creating a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force.”4 Therefore, it is critical to examine the 
feasibility of this goal, to identify the obstacles that stand in the way, and in turn to find 
solutions and determine what Japan must do, or, at the very least, to estimate the level at 
which Japan can meet its security objectives. To conduct this assessment, it is necessary 
                                                 
3 Hiroyuki Sugai, “Japan’s Future Defense Equipment Policy,” Brookings Institute, October 2016, 2, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
201610_japan_future_defense_hiroyuki_sugai.pdf. 
4 Government of Japan, “National Defense Program Guidelines,” 7. 
 3 
to assess the defense industry’s current capability to produce the hardware and support 
the strategies needed to overcome shortfalls.  
A deep look into the Government of Japan’s organizational structure and policies 
is also essential, because this may reveal major problems in supporting national goals. 
Japan’s bureaucrats are the architects of the NDPG. They not only control the national 
budget, make policy, and command the SDF, but they also work with the defense 
industry. It will be necessary to explore how Japan utilizes its civilian sector industries, 
its research and development programs, and overall human capital to rise to the challenge 
of fulfilling NDPG plans. Understanding bureaucratic inefficiency can help identify steps 
bureaucrats can take to support defense objectives. More importantly, these problems 
may reveal innovative solutions.  
Ultimately, this research deals with Japan’s national security, which has major 
implications for general balance-of-power concerns and for the U.S.-Japanese alliance. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As this thesis assesses Japan’s capacity to strengthen its defense in accordance 
with the NDPG, it will focus on two intertwined areas of literature:  first, current 
shortfalls, problems, and challenges the government and industrial sectors face in 
modernizing Japan’s defenses; and, second, required reforms and plausible solutions to 
these problems.  
The literature on Japan’s defense industry first points to a shortfall in the 
capability to indigenous development (kokusanka) of new weapons systems, resulting 
from a lack of experience due to both Japan’s long-time legal ban on producing certain 
offensive weapons systems and the nation’s continued dependence on U.S. defense 
equipment. Japan’s emergence in the international arms business would support NDPG 
goals because it could improve innovation, technical know-how, and the overall ability of 
Japanese industries to produce high-quality weapons systems with an eye toward 
strengthening Japan’s defense. In addition to bringing in needed revenue to reduce 
Japan’s own procurement costs, international sales offer the opportunity to work with 
 4 
allies to exchange new ideas and technologies, which also might boost Japan’s own 
ability to produce advanced products. However, as Sugai states,  
Japanese industry has been banned from developing specific cutting-edge 
technologies that can utilize weapons like developing aircraft … 
Therefore, Japan lost its technologies to develop aircrafts, [sic] and forced 




Despite this shortfall, Sugai highlights Japan’s ability to develop cutting-edge 
technology in the civilian sector, such as robotics and optical technology, but argues that 
these systems are not being merged to advance the weapons sector.
6
 Japan, though it 
possesses some of the most high-tech non-military technologies in the world, is now 
faced with the challenge of utilizing these systems to design future weapons platforms. 
Sugai presents an opening and possible solution: “currently, technologies that were not 
utilized in weapon systems are becoming the key to innovation ... These technologies, 
known as ‘dual use technology,’ should be an advantage for the Japanese defense 
industry.”
7
 Sugai is suggesting that industries can capitalize on “dual use technology” 
from the civilian sector, and refine them for military purposes. Tatsumi and Kennedy 
echo similar concerns by arguing that Japan will not be able to strengthen national 
defense due to domestic problems, and they state, “Japan will have to rely on innovation, 
both to maintain its superiority in certain military and dual-use technology, and to 
collaborate with its allies and partners to maximize its limited defense resources.”8 
Japan’s own white paper notes that “in terms of boosting military technologies . . . Japan 
would continue to place emphasis on conducting research and development (R&D) of 
                                                 
5 Sugai, “Defense Equipment Policy,” 22. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy, “Leveraging the Third Offset Strategy in the US-Japan 
Alliance,” Diplomat, October 28, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/Leveraging-The-Third-Offset-
Strategy-In-The-Us-Japan-Alliance/. 
 5 
equipment that integrates dual-use technologies.”9
 
The idea is that more R&D must be 
done to transform high-tech civilian products into military hardware. 
Sugai identifies a related flaw in the defense industry: it is not designed to 
communicate with other relevant actors, including the defense bureaucracy. For example, 
if one department inside Mitsubishi Heavy Industry discovers a faster method of 
producing parts, it might then share this knowledge across other departments and 
companies for all to benefit. He points to a lack of vision for the future and ineffective 
strategy as the root cause, but also articulates a solution:  
The essential areas where MOD and the Japanese defense industry should 
improve are the understanding of current and future situations, the sharing 
of knowledge and interaction across countries and foreign partners, and 
the [sic] creating a framework that permits innovative all actors across the 
country to tackle innovative challenges.
10
  
Sugai proposes three policies for future equipment policies: “utilizing various 
advantages that the Japanese industry has [its ‘production technique and element 
technologies’] while establishing a mutually interactive communication system,” “the 
enhancement of logistics support to allies and partners,” and “the expansion of capacity 
building assistance to the Southeast Asian countries.”11 Sugai views Japan’s lack of inter-
agency cooperation and policies that prevent growth and innovation as major challenges 
it must overcome to unlock its true potential. Sugai also highlights major initiatives that 
Japanese leaders have taken or are taking in response to the nation’s new security 
objectives. One of these is the implementation of the Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics Agency, which was created to integrate multiple defense equipment agencies.12 
Japan’s defense industry also faces a marketing problem in its struggle to break 
into the arms export business. In 2014, Japan officially became an international exporter 
of arms when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe removed the ban that had existed for decades. 
                                                 
9 Jon Grevatt, “Japan's White Paper Outlines Priorities for Defence Production,” Jane’s IHS Markit, 
August 16, 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/62954/japan-s-white-paper-outlines-priorities-for-defence-
production. 
10 Sugai, “Defense Equipment,” 24. 
11 Ibid., 35. 
12 Ibid., 12. 
 6 
The aim, according to Hornung (referenced in Pollman’s article) was to “(1) lower the 
costs for domestic procurement, (2) increase cooperation with the U.S., and (3) be a more 
active security partner to like-minded, i.e., status quo, states.”13 These three dynamics are 
important for helping defense industries to produce high-tech platforms. But one 
problem, as identified by Ganyard (referenced in Pollman’s article), is that “There is no 
demand for Japanese arms currently because of a lack of visibility, few globally 
competitive products, and steep prices.”14 He further argues that the defense industry’s 
only current customer is the Japanese government.15 An inability to acquire foreign 
customers is a problem because Japan’s industries simply cannot generate the revenue 
they need by exclusively selling to their own government. Officials within Japan’s own 
Ministry of Defense acknowledge that stiff competition in the international arms market 
may be a major challenge, compounded by the fact that Japan is inexperienced in the 
business:  “The U.S. sets the global defense equipment standard … Equipment that is not 
used by the U.S. is not going to be a viable business.”16 The problem for newcomers is 
that established arms exporters like the U.S. control most of the market. One strategy to 
offset this problem is for Japan to market weapons systems and parts that are different 
and limited in supply.17 For example, Japan might “focus on areas such as diesel 
submarine propulsion technology, which is unique and advanced.”18 Another possible 
approach might be to “take over production of equipment and parts no longer made in the 
U.S. For example, last year Tokyo approved plans to make seeker gyros used in the PAC-
2 missile defense system.”19 Hornung (referenced in Pollman’s article) similarly 
                                                 




16 Mari Yamaguchi and Elaine Kurtenbach, “Japan’s Ambitions for Defense Exports Boost Collide 
with Realities of Crowded, Tough Market,” US News, May 13, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/
business/articles/2015/05/13/japan-defense-export-hopes-dimmed-by-latecomer-status. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.   
 7 
“believes the focus should be on exporting, smaller niche components, such as missile-
tracking sensors used in ballistic missile defense systems.”20
 
 
Other literature identifies problems and solutions within government. In analyzing 
Japan’s current acquisition reform efforts in support of the NDPG, Sugai diagnoses 
deficiencies within Japan’s bureaucracy, including an inability to share information 
across agencies and inefficiencies in organizational structure and function.21 Sugai first 
argues that Japan’s well-honed methods of optimization, or “kaizen activities,” are not 
part of its broad strategy, and so methods of improvement are not shared.22 Second, he 
argues that the roles and responsibilities of individual bureaucratic positions are not 
evenly distributed, which slows the decision-making process and leaves the organization 
unprepared for change.23 Sugai argues that the “MOD has to establish a knowledge 
management system that can utilize all knowledge that the acquisition workforce has 
accumulated as explicit and tacit knowledge.”24 He further adds that the MOD must 
establish “an autonomous improvement culture where the entire workforce can improve 
itself by having people with different jobs work interactively.”25 He believes that sharing 
of information within groups will lead to improved output and decision-making.   
Similarly, on the topic of defense production, Sato notes that meeting NDPG 
goals is partly dependent upon sound decision-making from Japan’s top bureaucrats, but 
argues that conflicts and gridlock between ministries are likely and are a sure way to slow 
progress, particularly on the critical issue of defense equipment production.26 Similarly, 
Osius writes that “the Japanese and U.S. governments . . . suffer from the perennial 
predicament of all bureaucrats––turf battles. A successful strategic dialogue must cut 
across bureaucratic structures and overcome intragovernmental enmities (such as those 
                                                 
20 Pollman, “The Trouble With Japan's Defense Exports.” 
21 Sugai, “Defense Equipment Policy,” 19. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Sugai, “Defense Equipment Policy,” 2. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Heigo Sato, “Japan’s Arms Exports & Defense Production Policy,” Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, April 1, 2015, http://cogitasia.com/japans-arms-export-defense-production policy. 
 8 
between the State and Defense Departments ad between the Foreign Ministry and 
JDA).”27 For example, the MOD must make a balanced decision on how many F-35 
aircraft to purchase in the future. There may be gridlock between those advocating for 
different numbers, since purchasing too many might reduce funding for other key 
platforms, while purchasing too few might jeopardize Japan’s ability to achieve air 
superiority in its own air space. Sato writes that “Japan should establish a permanent 
council within the National Security Council or, preferably, the Prime Minister’s Office 
to make decisions on arms trade and the direction of defense equipment development and 
production.”28  
As one would expect, the existing literature also indicates that Japan’s budget 
poses a major challenge for the government, despite the spike in defense spending in 
recent years. A budget shortfall would seriously hamper Japan’s ability to purchase the 
required hardware identified in its 2017 MOD budget request paper, and thus may 
threaten Japan’s ability to meet mission requirements. Additionally, it threatens funding 
for other mission-critical programs such as R&D, training, and personnel welfare. Among 
possible competing priorities that may cut money from defense, Sugai includes “the 
postponement of raising the consumption tax rate or the continuously increasing cost of 
social security due to Japan’s rapidly aging society.”29 He also points out that only a 
portion of Japan’s defense budget is allocated to equipment, and that a large chunk of it is 
committed to maintenance and other costs.
30 
Tatsumi and Kennedy, similarly, write, “Due 
to an aging and declining population, coupled with an economy that has yet to pick up 
from two decades of economic stagnation, Japan will not have the capacity to 
considerably increase its investment in national defense,”31
 
but also remind the reader of 
the scale of Japan’s defense budget, which they note is a tenth of that of the United 
                                                 
27 Ted Osius. The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why It Matters and How to Strengthen It. (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2002), 83. 
28 Sato, “Japan’s Arms Export.”  
29 Sugai, “Defense Equipment Policy” 31. 
30 Ibid.  




The size and scope of Japan’s defense budget deserves analysis, especially since 
one of Japan’s goals is to deter China, whose budget eclipses Japan’s.  
To offset costs, one potential strategy is to partner with the U.S. technical sector. 
Tatsumi and Kennedy imply that Japan will be an integral partner in the U.S. Third 
Offset Strategy, which is the United States’ plan to counter an adversary’s growing 
technological capability. They write, “Already experienced in cooperative joint defense 
technological development with the U.S., Japan boasts a highly advanced Self-Defense 
Force (SDF) that has enjoyed deep military-to-military cooperation with the United 
States, share[s] many of the same security concerns worldwide, and has a very robust 
industrial and technological base.”32
 
They also argue that Japan and the U.S. can form a 
mutually beneficial partnership in this area, since both sides seek to achieve technological 
growth.33
 
Schoff, similarly, in response to Japan’s establishment of the Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics Agency, writes that “U.S. policymakers are welcoming Japan’s 
moves, in part for the opportunity to broaden the United States’ supplier network, 
improve cost efficiency, enhance alliance interoperability, and maintain an allied edge in 
certain military technologies where they fear other states are gaining.”34  
Newsham also expresses budget shortage concerns, but further argues that the 
government is mismanaging funds by not focusing on the needs of the SDF; he argues 
that the goal of acquiring advanced platforms has overshadowed the need for training:   
“Inadequate defense funding creates a readiness ‘death spiral’ of insufficient training 
time, inadequate aviation flight hours, lack of ability to fire assigned weapons, unrealistic 
field training, and critical personnel shortages.”35
 
Newsham also asserts that the defense 
strategy of Japan’s bureaucrats is not in sync with the JSDF (this is a coordination 
problem as well as a budgetary one). He writes, “Japan’s defense procurement strategy is 
                                                 
31
 Tatsumi and Kennedy, “Third Offset Strategy.” 
32
 Ibid. 
34James L. Schoff, “Navigating a New U.S.-Japan Defense Technology Frontier,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, March 10, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/10/
navigating-new-u.s.-japan-defense-technology-frontier-pub-59301. 
35Grant Newsham, “Japan’s Military Has Some Serious Problems (As China’s Military Gets 
Stronger)” The National Interest, September 07, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/japans-
military-has-some-serious-problems-chinas-military-17613. 
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not a well-thought-out, ‘requirements-based’ effort to buy or develop what Japan actually 
needs to defend itself – and enough of it. It often seems like a jobs program for Japanese 
industry, and with government ministries … too often working at cross-purposes and 
seldom asking the JSDF what it thinks.”36
 
Newsham’s solutions are in line with his 




The literature also identifies political problems faced by both government and 
industry. One is the Japanese people’s potential and/or perceived lack of will to support 
Japan’s defense, given the country’s postwar pacifist history. As Sato writes that “open 
debate must be conducted both to address the anxiety among the Japanese public on the 
development of the defense trade, and to relax tension among Japan’s defense production 
companies, which are alarmed about facing public criticism.”38 The challenge involves 
getting buy-in not only from the general public, but also from the companies that produce 
hardware. Schoff shares this concern: “Japanese firms also face an element of 
reputational risk. Defense-related sales often make up just a small percentage of a 
company’s total revenue, and many executives worry that high-profile arms exports 
might alienate the peace-loving Japanese public.”39 Pryor, discussing the establishment 
of the ATLA, writes, “Businesses are concerned about the public labeling them as 
‘merchants of death’ if they see their technology or goods used in warfare, and are 
looking to the government to take the lead.”40 These authors pinpoint a serious roadblock 
for Japan that researchers often miss. The literature in this area focuses heavily on the 
inability of the defense and acquisition sectors to deliver required hardware, but the will 
of the Japanese people to go forward with these initiatives needs to be highlighted as 
well. Ultimately, technical capability cannot be attained if it conflicts with the ideology 
of the people.   
                                                 
36 Newsham, “Japan’s Military Has Some Serious Problems,” 2. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Sato, “Japan’s Arms Exports.” 
39 Schoff, “U.S.-Japan Defense Technology Frontier.” 
40 Crystal Pryor, “Japan’s New Approach to Defense Technology,” Diplomat, November, 24, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/japans-new-approach-to-defense-technology/. 
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Policymakers may be vulnerable to such concerns as well. The modernization of 
Japan’s defense to the level proposed in the NDPG has many moving parts, and the 
literature points to the need for a massive joint effort from numerous sectors within the 
government and private sector, as well as support from the U.S. Such moves, however, 
would propel Japan to new levels of defense build-up, creating tough decisions for Prime 
Minister Abe and his cabinet at the domestic and international levels. 
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II. CHALLENGES TO JAPAN’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
As producers of high-tech military platforms and related components, Japan’s 
defense industry plays a vital role in achieving the NDPG objectives. This chapter 
identifies three major challenges Japan’s defense industry will likely face in supporting 
the NDPG objectives, in both the short long term. These include the lack of indigenous 
capabilities (kokusanka) in developing weapons systems, budget constraints, and troubles 
competing in the international arms export market. Kokusanka will especially be a focus 
item as it is key to an effective long-term strategy, and one that will prove particularly 
difficult to overcome. This thesis acknowledges Japan’s elite global status in the defense 
production business, but also exposes the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that the Abe 
administration must address going forward.  
A. CHALLENGES IN INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT (KOKUSANKA) 
One strategic route Japan can take to support the NDPG goals is to strengthen its 
indigenous defense production capabilities (kokusanka): the ability to invent, procure, 
and develop weapons platforms 100 percent domestically. This section provides evidence 
of how kokusanka supports Japan’s industrial capacity, explains why kokusanka supports 
long-term security objectives, and analyzes the challenges that might emerge if and when 
kokusanka is pursued. 
Why is kokusanka so important to Japan’s defense industry, and how does it 
support the national security strategy? More importantly, what factors have hindered 
Japan’s indigenous production capabilities? To answer the former question, the NDPG 
itself states, “Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases 
is essential . . . for research and development of equipment that fits the operational 
environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence.”41
  
The current security situation in East Asia, as well as Japan’s security strategy 
calls for effective deterrence. In Japan’s case, North Korea’s and China’s (among other 
                                                 
41 Government of Japan, “National Defense Program Guidelines,” 26. 
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nations) offensive weapons pose the greatest threat to its interests. Therefore, deterrence 
will translate into attaining military systems that are technologically superior, or at least 
on par with those nation’s capabilities. This is especially true in confronting the Chinese 
juggernaut, which possesses high-tech hardware in massive quantities and where having 
an edge in the quality of weaponry could make up for its disadvantage in quantity. It is 
then safe to say that achieving deterrence will be highly dependent on Japan’s R&D/
technology institutions and defense industries to apply kokusanka, to facilitate in 
developing more advanced systems. An applicable comparison is the nation of Israel, 
which like Japan is a small state, and one that also relies on its alliance with the U.S. for 
national security. In addition to its close ties with the U.S., Israel possesses some of the 
most advanced indigenously developed weapons that have both defeated and deterred its 
hostile neighbor adversaries for decades. The strength of Israel’s deterrence is weapons 
superiority; maintaining an edge in indigenous production will remain critical to this 
equation.  
On a basic level, it is inarguable that nations with technologically superior 
weapons have the advantage in the 21st century. It is also important to consider the 
overarching positive effect kokusanka has on the overall industry in terms of research and 
development and logistics, which directly support Japan’s national security strategy.42
 
As 
Green articulates, “with kokusanka  . . . there are often other advantages: expanded 
resource utilization, experimentation with spin-on applications of technology, systems 
integration experience, and momentum in technology development.”43 The idea here is 
that autonomous defense production facilitates all aspects of Japan’s industrial production 
capabilities, and that technology is transferable to other sectors.  
The question then becomes, why is kokusanka necessary, when –unlike in Israel– 
there is an active U.S. military presence protecting Japan’s mainland? This is not to say 
that Japan should shift its policies towards a gradual withdrawal from U.S. dependence. 
In fact, it is vital for Japan to continue hedging strategically with the world’s greatest 
                                                 
42 Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance, Politics, and Postwar Search for 
Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 3. 
43 Ibid., 18. 
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superpower, especially given the United States’ pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. 
However, Japan must also maintain and strengthen indigenous capabilities to achieve true 
deterrence because American hegemony today is highly contested. With factors such as 
budgetary constraints and the continued war on terrorism eating up military resources in 
recent years, the U.S. has, and will, ask more from the JSDF. Green brings up another 
compelling argument about the alliance when he states, “aligning with a powerful state is 
necessary to deter powerful enemies, but the client state (in this case Japan) always faces 
the risk of either entrapment or abandonment.”44
 
Although abandonment is far-fetched, 
entrapment has indeed been a reality. While Japan enjoys extensive protection from a 
heavy U.S. military presence in its homeland, this dependence also brings entrapment. 
Green argues that kokusanka is necessary in addition despite to the U.S. alliance because 
“autonomy in defense production capability leads to equality in alliance by providing 
Japan the ability to defend itself and to contribute to the maintenance of the alliance on an 
equal footing, rather than as a technology-dependent junior partner.”45
 
Maintaining a 
strong capability in defense equipment production is a necessary tool for leverage in 
negotiations with the United States and to maximize joint military operability.  
Kokusanka is also in line with technonationalism, which Samuels describes as “a 
fusion of industrial, technology, and national security policies.”46
 
It essentially implies 
that a strong nation must maintain a domestic defense sector. The NDPG repeatedly 
emphasizes plans to build a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force,”47 which is consistent with 
expectations that Japan will take on a greater military role in the Asia-Pacific, as well as 
conducting unprecedented operations to support U.S. objectives in the region. While it is 
true that America’s commitment to Japan’s defense remains solid today, Japan might 
incorporate kokusanka as part of its long-term strategy. While the alliance remains a 
cornerstone for defense, it would serve Japan well to plan for a future scenario in which 
national defense falls solely on its own shoulders. This initiative will be highly dependent 
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on the country’s defense industries to deliver the goods. As it stands, Japan’s lack of 
domestic development has left a legacy of struggles in procuring its own defense 
hardware. 
1. Post WWII History 
Among the factors that have hindered kokusanka since WWII, the most salient is 
Japan’s historical reliance on the U.S. in terms of both defense equipment and military 
presence, thereby limiting its defense industry after WWII. As this section argues, this 
historical lack of experience will be a major limiting factor if kokusanka is pursued today.  
In the post-World War II era, during the U.S. occupation, aside from the setbacks 
Japan faced in rebuilding its infrastructure and facing restrictions put on its defense 
industrial production, Japan’s indigenous production sharply declined as industries were 
rebuilt under the U.S. umbrella of interests. Initially, Japan’s industry was heavily aided 
by the U.S. rebuilding project, which provided money, weaponry, and other resources to 
the jumpstart the industrial acquisitions process.48 This initiative, along with Japan’s role 
in producing war goods for the U.S. during the Korean War, resulted in the successful 
resurrection of Japan’s weapons industry operations in the first decade after WWII. 
However, these operations were primarily dominated by U.S.-directed contracts, mainly 
to produce munitions and to repair vehicles and aircraft.49
 
Despite learning greatly from 
U.S. weapons platforms (particularly aircraft),50
 
this period marked the beginning of not 
only Japan’s reliance on the U.S. for its defense, but also Japan’s reliance on American 
technology. Thus, it would be a slow process for Japan to establish its own research and 
development programs and begin indigenous production of its own defense hardware. As 
Green notes, “Japan produces about 90% of its military equipment at home, but much of 
that is built under license from U.S. firms with a considerable amount of technology 
black-boxed.”51 
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49 Ibid., 12. 
50 Ibid. 
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Despite the initial momentum for kokusanka in the post-WWII period, 
particularly among nationalists among the LDP, it was ultimately perceived as an 
obstacle to the alliance as well as something that would hurt Japan’s international 
relations. In the 1970s, the movement towards kokusanka took a deep hit with the 
creation of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The NDPO was heavily 
influenced by Kubo Takuya, who popularized the concept of a pragmatic limited defense 
capability based on potential threat rather than preparations for the worst-case scenario, 
and who thus advocated reliance on the U.S. in order to improve international relations 
by assuring Japan’s neighbors that militarization would not occur.52
 
The NDPO was 
eventually approved in 1976, and in it was Japan’s policy of reliance on the U.S.-Japan 
alliance for defense, and a commitment to the “Peacetime Defense Force doctrine” for 
determining military requirements.53 With an established commitment to rely on the U.S. 
for defense, there emerged the belief that a partnership with the U.S. in exchanging 
technology was important to Japan’s own technology; kokusanka was then believed to be 
an obstacle in this collusion with the U.S.54
 
The NDPO was thus a historical policy that 
suppressed the kokusanka movement, and one whose effects last today. Today, we see 
continued reliance on advanced U.S. weapons to achieve NDPG objectives, with foreign 
military sales (FMS) contracts at an all-time high, as illustrated by acquisition programs 
like the F-35A, V-22, and the Aegis system. 
2. Challenges in Pursuing Kokusanka
The broad challenge when pursuing greater autonomous development is to restore 
lost capabilities in designing, procuring, and developing truly original weapons systems. 
This is not to suggest that Japan should stop purchasing American weapon systems; in 
fact, sharing common weapons platforms is good for the alliance. However, pursuing 
kokusanka is also important, because it provides Japan the technical expertise it needs to 





and industry operate on a concept of dual-use technology. For a long period after World 
War II, Japan was prohibited from developing technologies that could be used for 
military systems. Today, it is the rule that technological development must have both 
military and civilian purposes. For example, when designing an avionics component for 
fighter jets, the Japanese believe it should be transferable to commercial airliners. This is 
unlike the U.S., where military and civilian projects run independently. The dual-use 
concept is a double-edged sword. While it is an incredibly advantageous method for 
developing advanced component technologies, it inhibits the ability to focus purely on 
military projects. While kokusanka requires a transition away from this practice, it will be 
a challenge because dual-use is so beneficial to the civilian sector and consistent with a 
pacifist nation narrative that puts greater emphasis on economic health.  
Another roadblock in the pursuit of kokusanka is U.S. pressure to export 
American systems, develop weapons through U.S. license transfers, or co-develop on 
various projects. The argument that alliance dependency results in entrapment is true in 
this case. As Japan has historically benefited from the U.S. umbrella of protection, there 
is an expectation of reciprocity to support the American defense industry. Another 
significant factor is that the partnership is also beneficial to both sides, and thus only 
increases U.S. pressure. As Green points out, “The potential for growing reliance on 
Japanese technology in advanced U.S. weaponry has been well documented in two 
separate studies prepared for the DOD’s DARPA, TASC, and IDA.”55
 
First, as Green 
articulates, “The pursuit of autonomous defense production also threatens to disrupt the 
macroeconomic benefits to Japan of alliance with the United States.”56
 
The concern is 
that the high cost of indigenous production would cut into the money allocated to pay for 
cost associated with these benefits.57
 
U.S. pressure did indeed come to fruition and 
intensified to full extent in the 1980s with Japan’s attempt to build an indigenous fighter 
jet, the FSX. This is the most prominent case of U.S. pressure. Seeking to support 
American defense companies and other economic gains, U.S. government agencies 
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initially pressured Japan to buy American, and later proposed joint development.58
 
The 
FSX issue sparked intense debates inside Japan’s bureaucracy between pro- and anti 
kokusanka factions. At the same time, there was strong opposition in the U.S. to the idea 
of joint development, as many in Congress expressed concerns that sensitive U.S. 
technology would be leaked. The agreement for joint development of the FSX did 
ultimately win out, which left many on both sides feeling dissatisfied. Another example 
of U.S. pressure was Japan’s decision to begin production of the P-3C rather than the 
locally designed PXL.59 Cases like these, among others, not only hindered Japan’s ability 
to procure its own aircraft, but also led to continued dependence on either U.S. aircraft 
license transfers or direct foreign military sales. U.S. pressure is not likely to go away and 
remains a major obstacle in seeking autonomy. 
Kokusanka is not non-existent:  there are some noteworthy indigenous projects, 
especially in the maritime and ground domain. However, these independent systems 
represent a small share compared to Japan’s reliance on U.S. imports, U.S. license 
production, and technology transfers. This is particularly true for aircraft. As Hughes 
points out, “Japan succeeded in rebuilding its aircraft defense production in the post-war 
period, using a mix of licensed and indigenous production for the F-86F, F-104J, F-4EJ, 
and the F-15J fighters, the T-1, T-2, and T-4 trainer aircraft, and C-1 transport.”60 
Hughes’s statement raises the question whether some of these aircraft are truly 
indigenous. Even though they technically fall under kokusanka, the fighters listed above 
are licensed American jets with Japanese variants developed and built by Japanese 
companies. It is no secret that the T-1, T-2, and T-4 are mere adaptations of American 
jets, even though on paper they are considered purely indigenous. Today, Japan’s two 
most operationally capable fighters the F-15J and Mitsubishi F-2 are derived from 
American models. Additionally, for years, Ministry of Defense and leaders in the JSDF 
have continually requested the purchase or licensing of America’s F-22 stealth fighter, 
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inarguably the most advanced fighter jet on the planet. With the U.S. Congress 
prohibiting transfer or sale of the F-22, the Japanese opted to purchase 42 F-35s this past 
year. Once again, this is a direct result of Japan’s remaining in the catch-up phase of 
indigenous production of fifth-generation stealth fighters. Although current capabilities 
are secured through the purchase of the F-35s, if Japan truly seeks guaranteed deterrence 
from countries like China, it must also be able to independently produce its own stealth 
fighter. The challenge for Japan is to transition away from its dependence on American 
weapons systems. This is not to say that Japan is making no progress in autonomous 
projects. Many point to the successful flight of the Mitsubishi X-2 in 2016 as Japan’s 
having achieved development of a stealth aircraft. Although the X-2 is a crucial project 
that has potential to become a legitimate sixth-generation stealth fighter, it is currently a 
lead into test stealth technology, not an actual stealth aircraft.61 According to a project 
manager, “X-2 gives us an experience of stealth airframe and engine integration only,” 
meaning that many challenges lie ahead in trying to incorporate advanced avionics and 
weapons.62 If and when the X-2 evolves into the planned stealth F-3, there remain 
looming questions because the project is still in the early development stages with many 
milestones still yet to be accomplished. 
Japan’s most pressing existential threat is posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile 
program, whose tests have recently increased in both frequency and technological 
advancement. However, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is an area where Japan’s arsenal 
consists of primarily U.S.-designed systems, including the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), 
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), and the Aegis destroyer. Japan has also 
expressed interest in the Terminal High Altitude Advanced Defense System (THAAD). 
Although these systems are now being jointly developed with the U.S., Japan’s entrance 
into the TMD program has been late. The indigenously developed Chu-SAM Kai air 
                                                 




defense system does show promise with successful upgrades and testing in late 2015.63
 
However, Kazuhiro Tobo of the TRDI notes that “Kai is a complex system in which each 
sensor is networked to intercept anti-aircraft threats” and that much further testing is 
required to determine its true capabilities.64 
B. DEFENSE BUDGET CONSTRAINTS  
Japan’s defense budget has shown consecutive growth in recent years, and it may 
appear that the pacifist country is transitioning towards military normalization. As the 
NDPG requires military modernization, Japan has taken bold actions such as creating the 
Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and purchasing F-35s. 
However, while the defense budget has been on an upward trend, with plans to acquire 
expensive high-tech platforms, it has for years remained steady at only one percent of 
overall GDP. As this section will argue, the one percent budget cap has prevented Japan 
from developing a strong acquisitions base and puts into question whether it can fund 
newly established programs. Additionally, this section will identify two additional 
potential problems associated with Japan’s budget, fiscal troubles and deferred method of 
financing defense equipment. Lastly, this section will show that the claim of an 
increasing defense budget is misleading.  
1. One Percent of GDP Spending on Defense 
Following a policy established in 1976, the Diet abides by a rule keeping defense 
spending at around 1 percent of overall GDP. Due to post-WWII pacifism, there is an 
embedded lack of desire for militarism in Japanese society, which is reflected in 
microcosm in its defense budget. As Sugai notes, “this trend means that Japan’s defense 
budget has not been directly responding to its security environment, but has been 
pursuing the implicit restriction that Japan’s defense budget shouldn’t exceed one percent 
of the GDP.”65 Even though major military acquisitions receive a great deal of public 
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exposure, it is important to remember that defense contracts represent a small portion of 
revenue for major companies like Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Kawasaki. It is no secret that 
Japan’s bread and butter is commercial civilian markets such as automobiles, electronics, 
robotics, and other specialized components. In fact, Herman notes that defense sales 
account for only 4 percent, with global industry giants like MHI standing at 5.6 percent.66
 
Although the Abe administration appears to be reversing this trend, change will not come 
easily. Even the approved record budget hike for 2017 represents only a 1.4% increase 
since 2016, while remaining under one percent of overall GDP.67
 
Table 1 and Figure 2 
break down the defense budget since 1975 and show minimal fluctuation over the last 40-
plus years. 
Table 1.   Japan’s Defense Budget 1975–199068 
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Figure 1.  Japan’s Military Expenditure 1997–201569 
 
The 1 percent policy has also slowed the development of Japan’s defense 
acquisition process. It has greatly hindered Japan from developing an effective 
acquisitions methodology, and puts into question the funding availability for the newly 
created ATLA.70
 
As discussed below, the ATLA is a newly formed organization that 
aims to revamp Japan’s ability to design and deliver advanced defense equipment. 
Although it represents a major step towards acquisitions reform, is it questionable 
whether the Diet can continue to fund this organization in the long run. The fact that this 
agency has only just been established shows the lack of progress made in this field. As 
Wright describes, “Japan has been left with an under-developed government logistics 
arm, rather than one capable of developing a cohesive national acquisition strategy and 
interface with domestic defense firms.”71
 
It will likely take years for the ATLA to 
develop into an effective organization, as growing pains are inevitable.  
The big question is how much it will cost to sustain this agency. With high cost 
and significant time requirements associated with local procurement and sustainment, 
there is uncertainty as to whether the current budget will be adequate, because there are 
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many unforeseen costs such as research, testing, and maintenance. And, as Wright notes, 
“one particularly unsavory problem caused by the 1 percent restriction has been the effect 
on the individual services within the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, which activate, staff, 
fund, and pay for their own service-specific research, development, and weapons 
acquisition.”72
 
Having committed to such an organization, the Diet may have to face 
unforeseen costs not currently calculated in the budget. For example, once a product is 
deemed fully operational, the challenge is to set up an efficient logistical support system 
to maintain it from cradle to grave. This includes establishing hundreds of parts 
manufacturers, contracting for maintenance vendors, training, and so on. This is currently 
the problem with the X-2 stealth program. If and when it progresses into an X-3 stealth 
jet program, the price tag is estimated to be $40 billion, and the aircraft will not be 
mission ready until 2030.73
 
High costs will likely spark debates in the Diet. They may 
very well lead to scrapping the program entirely and opting for continued dependence on 
the F-35, which is advantageous in cost, but still extraordinarily expensive nonetheless. 
Ultimately, the Diet may have to re-think its traditional 1 percent cap on defense budget 
if it wants to pursue the NDPG’s goals. 
2. Fiscal Problems 
Since defense spending is correlated with the economic health of a nation, Japan 
may face some serious hardships in the coming years. Japan’s current debt, which 
amounts to over 200% of GDP, poses a problem for the future.74 Economist Takatoshi Ito 
argues “unless the Japanese government can raise its sales tax to north of 15%, from its 
current 8%, Japan’s economy will suffer a fiscal crisis sometime between 2021 and 
2023.”75
 
If such a crisis occurs, it puts into questions whether Japan can weather the costs 
associated with maintaining newly purchased systems. Where will the money come from 
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to fund repair facilities, buy parts, or pay contractors?  In terms of operating costs, will 
the JSDF be able to conduct enough training exercises to maintain readiness? These are 
questions to think about. Although not a major issue currently, if fiscal troubles lay 
ahead, defense industries will likely face tough cuts, as the government will have to 
prioritize spending.  
An ongoing problem in East Asia, but particularly in Japan, is the lopsided 
demographics of an aging population as the birth rate continues to decline. Aside from 
the long-term problem of labor shortages, an aging population forces the government to 
allocate its budget toward social security and pension payments. This will be a serious 
problem in the long run. In fact, Gray points out that Japan’s population is projected to 
decrease by 33 million in about 30 years while the population of senior citizens 
skyrockets, and he argues that this factor will stifle future defense budgets.76 As the gap 
continues to grow, “government annual security benefits to the elderly, including pension 
and health care, are expected to grow to 27% of GDP in the next three decades, more 
than a 15% increase from 11.8% in 2000.”77 Another staggering statistic is that the social 
security budget has increased by 9 percent in the last three decades.78
 
Figures 3 and 4 
illustrate the rising cost of social security over the past three decades. With defense 
spending needs at an all-time high, this puts into serious doubt whether the defense 
industry and related activities will receive adequate funding in the long run. Although the 
aging population is a long-term problem, it will no doubt impact the defense budget and 
further complicate plans in purchasing and upgrading future defense equipment. This 
does not mean that security objectives cannot be met; it does mean that tough choices lie 
ahead in picking and choosing different weapons platforms and programs. 
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Figure 2.  Japan’s Social Security versus Military Spending79 
 
Figure 3.  Japan’s Social Security versus Military Spending Comparison in 
GDP80 
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3. Deferred Payment Method  
Another interrelated potential problem is the Japanese defense payment practice 
known as saimu futan koi; essentially a “buy now, pay later” form of financing in which 
most payment is not made until the final years after purchase.81
 
While the practice of 
saimu futan koi has been useful in keeping the defense budget within one percent, 
continual deferment of payment can limit the purchase of vital future weapons platforms, 
because it puts restrictions on the future budget. Incurring payments from previous years 
can prove problematic when critical purchases are needed for the current year. Hughes 
notes that rising personnel wages and pensions add to the obligatory payments from 
saimu futan koi, giving the Diet no choice but to sacrifice defense equipment purchases.82 
Hughes’ statistics in Figure 4 show that the budget for defense acquisition has decreased 
6.5 percent over the last 20 years.83
 
At a time when defense modernization is crucial to 
achieving deterrence, Japan could potentially be limited in its power to purchase major 
programs like ballistic missile defenses, submarines, and stealth aircraft. 
Figure 4.  Percentage of Japanese Defense Budget on Equipment (1998–2010)84 
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Although the Abe administration has consistently raised the defense budget 
during the past five years, this might not equate to massive purchases of military 
equipment or many more defense contracts. Additionally, increases in defense spending 
do not necessarily equate to boost for the defense industry. As Tatsumi notes for the 
historic budget increase of 2016, in which a significant portion was allocated to the 
“SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa)-related expenses,” which she asserts 
are unrelated to supporting the JSDF or weapons development.85
 
Similarly, Crystal Pryor 
argues the budget increase of 2016 will only offset for the costs associated with the 
relocation of Futenma (SACO), growing personnel expenses, and depreciation of the yen; 
she further finds that Japan’s defense budget, not accounting for SACO, would be 
equivalent to the 2002 budget.86
 
While it is true that major high-tech system purchases 
and upgrades are planned, the budget allocation towards them might not be very 
significant within the overall, big-picture budget. The weakening of the yen is also 
something to monitor with FMS from the U.S. accounting for a majority of Japan’s new 
acquisitions. Table 2 shows that Japan’s defense budget is actually on a downward trend 
when the depreciation of the yen is accounted for.87 Ultimately, there are many 
competing budget priorities. The reality is that Japan will face stiff challenges in funding 
all its necessary defense modernization activities. Although Prime Minister Abe has 
articulated a bold vision to strengthen national defense, budget constraints will likely 
result in compromises.
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Table 2.     Pattern of Defense Spending (1955–2015)88 
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C. CHALLENGES IN THE DEFENSE EXPORT MARKET 
In 2014, the Abe administration took the historic step of removing Japan’s nearly 
50-year ban on exporting arms. This was a milestone in that Japan can now 
internationally market its state-of-the-art military systems, such as tanks, submarines, and 
helicopters. Though long overdue, this decision is a step in the right direction for NDPG 
plan fulfillment because it allows Japan to interact with international partners in the back-
and-forth exchange of marketing strategies. Also, as the “Strategy on Defense Production 
and Technological Bases” paper notes, “Japan’s defense industries must strengthen their 
international competitiveness to respond to changes.”89 Additionally, international 
marketing will be a key activity in advancing the four missions of the ATLA, most 
notably its mission to “Strengthen Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation.”90
 
Finally, another benefit is certainly the revenue this will bring in to boost the economy 
and thus offset the high cost of domestic production.  
While removing the ban on arms export is an historic step that can strengthen 
national defense, achieving success in the international arms market will be a significant 
challenge because of Japan’s late entry. Building legitimacy and competing with nations 
with established military sales programs will be a difficult task. Most problematic is the 
fact that the U.S. controls a majority of the international arms market with its unmatched 
and proven weapons platforms. For example, the F-16 and F-15 fighter jets are sold to 
multiple countries on almost every continent, while the list of F-35 customers is growing. 
Also, as previously identified, much of Japan’s defense systems are U.S. technology 
transfers, and even much of Japan’s indigenous platforms is derived from American 
designs. Therefore, as Herman points out, this reduces the “likelihood that foreign 
countries will buy Japanese when they can acquire the same technologies directly from 
the United States, probably at reduced cost.”91
 
Table 3 ranks the top 25 defense exporters 
in the world; Japan is not included. 
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Table 3.   Defense Export International Ranking92 
 
 
One major problem is the fact that Japanese hardware, though technologically 
advanced, is not battle tested. As Herman argues, “foreign customers may like the 
sophisticated features of Japan’s Type 90 battle tank or its OH-1 observation helicopter, 
but they also like a tank or helicopter that’s been tested on the battlefield, as Russian and 
U.S. export products have.”93
 
Another problem is that defense contracts represent a tiny 
portion of sales for even Japan’s largest companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 
and therefore are not a high-interest item from a managerial point of view.94
 
Table 4 
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shows that only 4 out of 20 top defense companies have a defense share above 5 percent. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Japanese companies are leaving the defense 
business in large numbers in favor of the more lucrative civilian sector; they left in record 
numbers in the early 2000s due to lack of orders, thereby making it difficult for these 
companies to use defense contracts to profit from the civilian side.95 It will then be 
difficult to convince corporate executives to invest their efforts into international sales. 
Another discouraging fact is that the MOD had been the sole customer for many 
companies, yielding an atmosphere where competition is nonexistent.96
 
Finally, 
inexperience in marketing is something Japan will need to quickly overcome if it wants to 
succeed.  
Table 4.   Major Japanese Companies and Share of Defense Contracts97 
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The failure to sell the Soryu-class submarine to Australia is a perfect example. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki were not able to adapt to requested system 
changes, while France (the fourth largest exporter) was able to capitalize; the Abe 
administration, further, failed to use political tools to engage the Australian leadership.98
 
According to Newsham, “I haven’t seen . . . increased opportunities, partly owing to 
Japanese companies being ‘babies in the woods’ in what is a sharp-elbowed business. 
Nor is there much evidence I’ve seen that Japan Inc. sees defense exports as a particularly 
attractive niche.”99 Newsham not only describes an inexperience problem, but also 
questions whether the government will remain in the export business if it deems it to be 
ineffective. These challenges can be overcome, but it will take years for Japan to succeed 
in the export business, as there will be growing pains. Also, as this thesis will later 
discuss, Japan will need to apply specific strategies that build on its strengths. 
Aside from challenges to succeeding in the international arms market, the defense 
industry may also be reluctant to participate in the global weapons market for ideological 
reasons (on the public’s part, even if not their own). As pacifism still resonates strongly 
today in Japan, leaders of major defense firms might oppose the idea of being suppliers of 
war material. As noted above, Pryor writes that “businesses are concerned about the 
public labeling them as ‘merchants of death’ if they see their technology or goods used in 
warfare.”100
 
Thus, far, there appear to be no specific cases of company leaders publicly 
expressing their opposition. However, as Herman writes, “if Japan does become a rising 
defense exporter, those narratives could be easily attached to the process, especially if 
Japanese technology is used in a conflict involving the loss of human life.”101 If such 
events do occur, there may be huge backlash from the public, which in turn will further 
dissuade defense companies from supporting the policy.  
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The Japanese public has indeed been protesting Abe’s pro-militarism path. 
Among many other protests, an estimated 120,000 people in August of 2015 assembled 
around the government building in Tokyo.102 Although these protests were not directed at 
the newly legalized defense export policy or at defense industries themselves, Herman 
explains that this was “in part because it was overshadowed by the controversy regarding 
Article 9, but also because defense exports do not have a notorious historical legacy 
linked to Japan’s imperialist past.”103
 
In other words, the broad opposition towards 
Article 9 revision actually masked the awareness of an export ban policy, and thus was 
able to forestall criticism. But while defense exports are not being tied with Japan’s past, 
this is primarily because Japan was banned from the practice. With the ban now lifted, 
there is potential for this situation to change. Employees of Japan’s defense companies 
may also be ideologically opposed to exporting arms, which may lead them to leave the 
organization, which could then lead to production shortfalls.  
This chapter has outlined the challenges of Japan’s defense industry in supporting 
the NDPG. These boil down to history, policy, ideology, and ties with the U.S. This 
thesis does not underestimate the strengths of Japan’s defense industry base, which ranks 
high by international comparison. It also does not conclude that Japan cannot overcome 
challenges related to kokusanka, the budget, or entering the international arms market. It 
does provide a specific framework for Japan’s leaders to focus on in trying to meet 
NDPG objectives. The new NDPG is bold and contains unprecedented guidelines. As the 
defense industry is at the forefront of supported unprecedented capabilities, its leaders 
must work towards problem resolution because its challenges are significant. 
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III. CHALLENGES POSED BY JAPAN’S GOVERNMENT, 
SOCIETY, AND ECONOMIC PARTNERS 
A. OVERVIEW 
There is no doubt that the 2013 NDPG contains unprecedented aggressive 
language that articulates the imminent security threats that Japan faces today. It also 
specifies bold commitments the nation will take to confront threats in the new security 
environment. As the NDPG represents the official position of Japan’s government, Prime 
Minister Abe and his cabinet should evaluate the strength and weaknesses of various 
government organizations in carrying out these commitments. Specifically, they should 
evaluate the capabilities of different ministries/agencies to formulate policies and 
strategies that are unified, effective, feasible, and will receive public support. Success 
will be dependent on the performance of Japan’s cabinet and the ministries, the architects 
with the power to guide Japan’s path going forward. This chapter will first investigate the 
internal deficiencies of the ministries, including the MOFA, MOD, METI, and MOF, by 
identifying issues/factors that cause gridlock and inefficient decision-making. This 
chapter will then examine specific challenges that hinder the Prime Minister and his 
cabinet from achieving the NDPG goals. This section will focus specifically on the 
factors that prevent Japan’s militarization: 1) legal authority of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau; 2) roots of pacifism; and 3) geopolitical risks. Lastly, carrying out the NDPG 
objectives ultimately lies with the health and capability of the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces. This chapter will examine the organizational and operational problems that the 
JSDF faces today. As this thesis argues, major deficiencies and shortfalls exist within 
these government organizations, and there are societal and regional factors that affect 
(and may limit) Japanese policies as well. This chapter identifies these problems and 
shortfalls, explains why they exist, and assesses how they may limit fulfillment of 
Japan’s security objectives. 
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B. CHALLENGES TO JAPAN’S BUREAUCRACY 
As the nation transitioned to a civilian-dominant society after WWII, Japan’s 
central bureaucracy came to exert significant power over the nation as it controlled 
policies and regulations. Japan’s bureaucrats still exercise enormous power through 
legitimacy gained over the years from an organizational structure that has survived 
through the U.S. occupation, and as the architects that transformed Japan into an 
economic giant.104 It is widely known that bureaucratic seats in the government are 
reserved for Japan’s academic elite graduating from top universities. On top of the food 
chain under the cabinet are the various ministries. Among the most influential in defense 
policy are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI); and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which was upgraded from the 
Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) in 2007. Also, despite not having formal decision-
making authority, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) is an agency with enormous 
power in influencing Japanese legislation. However, has history as shown, Japan’s 
bureaucracy is filled with gridlock, as competing interests often result in inefficiencies in 
decision-making. This is especially true in regards to issues of national defense. 
Additionally, corruption among bureaucratic and defense industry leaders has been a 
widespread problem, which puts into question the integrity of appointed officials. As this 
thesis argues, these issues are major constraints on Japan’s initiative to expand its defense 
apparatus to support the NDPG. 
1. Gridlock within the Ministries 
The post-war legacy of civilian control of the military brings with it inefficiencies 
and competing interests inside the bureaucracy. As with many political systems in the 
world, Japan’s bureaucracy is comprised of various organizations vying to pursue 
different agendas. The politics of national defense have historically caused gridlock 
inside the bureaucracy as competing opinions have clashed. Why is gridlock problematic 
in terms of meeting NDPG objectives? Primarily, the NDPG lays out Japan’s unique 
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defense challenges and priorities for the complex security environment of the 21st 
century, and therefore may change the paradigm in approaching defense strategy. Such 
changes will continue to raise new issues, spark debates, and increase the amount of 
complex decision making inside Japan, and it therefore may lead to increased gridlock in 
the ministries because it may result in more conflicting viewpoints. This may then 
undermine the ability of Japan’s leaders to develop a cohesive defense strategy to support 
the NDPG. 
 
One starting point for discussion is the former Japan Defense Agency, (JDA) 
which was established as a subordinate organization to the higher ministries in order to 
reduce military influence; the idea was to put serious checks on the JDA’s ability to make 
key political decisions and to ensure civilian oversight of all activity.105 In that sense, the 
JDA’s scope of authority in the past did not go beyond control of the SDF, with limited 
influence on broader security matters.106 Instead, other ministries’ officials, working 
inside the JDA, were actually responsible for presenting legislation to the cabinet. But 
this structure also created a legacy of competition in which too many ministries compete 
on defense policies, which inevitably has led to gridlock. As Chinworth writes, 
“seconded officials from the Foreign Affairs, Finance, and International Trade and 
Industry ministries, are involved in key decisions in such critical areas as policy planning 
and procurement,” and “with the presence of so many officials from key ministries 
throughout the JDA, it is difficult if not impossible for any single agency to prevail in all 
policy debates and every individual defense-procurement decision.”107 Although the JDA 
was upgraded to the MOD in 2007 and is now on equal footing with the MOFA, MITI, 
and MOF, it still lacks autonomous decision-making power when it comes to national 
defense. As Chinworth argues, this is primarily because the ministries for many years 
were embedded within the JDA in key posts. The most salient is the internal bureau 
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inside the JDA with ultimate decision-making power, which before the transition to the 
MOD was staffed by other ministry officials, not the JDA.108
  
The establishment of the MOD does not give the ministry free rein to push for 
defense modernization or more aggressive rules of engagement for the SDF. Even though 
the MOD now has greater power to advocate for increased roles for the JSDF, MOFA 
personnel are still the primary diplomats responsible for setting the framework of national 
security strategy and for taking the lead in managing policies related to the U.S.-Japanese 
alliance.109 Additionally, as Japan’s lead diplomats, MOFA officials represent the 
government during major multilateral talks with prominent international institutions such 
as ASEAN, and in doing so “[stress] Japan’s positive postwar role as a peaceful 
contributor to the international community.”110
 
Even though it would seem that the MOD 
has the greatest leverage in determining defense policies today, as Oros notes, “SDF and 
MOD independence to craft and pursue military policy is highly constrained by other 
actors and by the security identity of domestic antimilitarism.”111 As argued, the MOFA 
competes with the MOD over security policies.  
Japan’s METI (formerly known as MITI) has enormous power as the lead 
organization for managing all economic and trade activity. Although not directly 
involved in developing defense policy, it holds authority in decisions made inside the 
defense industry, as this is interconnected with economic policy. METI has historically 
taken positions against the defense industry if they conflicted with the interests of the 
overall industry, such as its opposition to exporting defense technology in 1983.112
 
As the 
previous chapter detailed Japan’s application of dual-use technology, METI has been the 
enforcer of this rule in that all new defense projects must be vetted through it to make 
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sure it benefits the civil sector.113 For instance, if Japan were to pursue an indigenously 
developed intercontinental ballistic missile program, METI would most likely support the 
program only if certain components, (e.g., the guidance system) could also be used on 
commercial vehicles. This is an example of how each ministry approaches national 
defense from its own tunnel vision perspective. 
Bureaucratic gridlock is especially problematic in that it has historically 
constrained Japan’s defense budget. Similar to the way America’s defense budget is 
highly affected by lobbying politics, so too is Japan’s system. The root problem is that 
ministries make budget decisions based not only on actual operational defense needs, but 
also on legal terms, and the perceived equity of the budget allocation.114 In doing so, 
Peters argues, Japan’s bureaucracy is “characterized by lack of direction and 
conservatism.”115
 
For instance, the MOD will make an annual defense budget request 
based on what it feels is a fair entitlement compared to what other programs are 
receiving. For example, if it deems that healthcare is getting an unequal share of the pie, 
it might cry foul and demand redistribution. Also, the Ministry of Finance maintains the 
power to oversee and review the annual budget, and in doing so, it has historically put 
constraints on the defense budget.116
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Japan operates 
under the rule that defense spending cannot exceed one percent of overall GDP. The 
MOF is the enforcing organization of this rule in that any proposal for military spending 
by the MOD must be justified in part by having both civilian technology utilization and 
aiding the overall economy.117 This presents a problem in today’s sensitive security 
environment, where the budget should be judged upon whether it reflects requirements to 
deter threats, not whether it violates the one percent rule. 
The FSX conflict clearly illustrates how competing interests inside the 
bureaucracy can lead to massive gridlock. The FSX was the planned kokusanka project to 
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develop a fourth-generation fighter jet to replace the F-1. Initially, leaders of the JDA and 
SDF and some in MITI supported the initiative for autonomous development. However, 
there was polarization inside MITI between those who supported kokusanka in the belief 
that it would strengthen Japan’s industrial base and those that felt the project would drain 
the nation of precious resources that would be better utilized elsewhere.118 The division 
was exacerbated when the U.S. relentlessly pressured for co-development. Ultimately, the 
decision for co-development prevailed, as there was fear that kokusanka would jeopardize 
trade relations with the U.S.119 Although Japan eventually benefited with the co-
development of the F-2, it was a long, drawn-out decision that wasted years of healthy 
production. 
The root cause of the gridlock problem is ultimately conflicting interests and 
power politics inside the bureaucracy. As the ministry with the most power in 
determining security policy, MOFA has traditionally prioritized the importance of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in its overall strategizing, meaning it will abstain from making 
policies that will jeopardize the relationship.120 As another major player in formulating 
defense policy, METI’s interests are obviously driven by Japan’s global economic 
strength. The MOD is, of course, focused on Japan’s military capability and defense 
readiness. Gridlock is not surprising in Japan’s bureaucracy, considering that each 
ministry views defense policy from such a different perspective.  
2. Inefficient Decision-Making 
Another enduring problem in Japan’s bureaucracy is inefficient decision-making 
on many fronts. One salient reason is what Keddell describes as a culture that values 
“consensual decision-making” rather than “majority decision-making.”121
 
He argues that 
this causes long lead times in actually making a decision, as well as poor decisions 
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because group consensus is valued over the importance of the decision itself.122
 
And as 
Campbell contends, this discourages alternative options because decisions are made 
based on the dynamic relationship between ministry officials.123
 
This is problematic 
because long critical thinking is required when formulating decisions on national security 
policy, especially when lives are at stake. While compromise leads to greater cohesion in 
decision-making, these decisions might not be in the best interest of the country. 
 
Another criticism of the Japanese government system is that a small group of 
bureaucrats draft legislation and submit it to the cabinet without sufficient inputs from 
outside experts.124
 
The NDPG falls into this category because it is a product developed 
primarily by the MOD and National Security Council, but without opinions from civilian 
leaders outside the government. Sugai draws a comparison with the American legislation 
process, in which Congress coordinates with multiple departments inside the cabinet as 
well as subject matter experts in academia, whereas the Japanese process is “bottom-up 
specific planning by career bureaucrats.”125
 
This represents a decision-making problem 
because the cabinet is essentially approving a policy with a limited scope of perspective. 
For a policy document like the NDPG, which has huge strategic implications, it should 
also include advice from experts in Japan’s non-government organizations, such as 
academia, think tanks, the defense industry, etc. Shortfalls and limiting factors can only 
be identified through multilateral perspectives. In particular, the drafting policy should 
include leaders from the defense industry, because the NDPG calls for specific military 
capabilities that are dependent on weapons platforms. For example, Section Two states, 
“the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including 
HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using 
unmanned aerial vehicles.”126
 
A detailed plan such as this requires consultation from 
defense company experts who can provide specific details on the production of 
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reconnaissance planes, satellites, and radar equipment, and who can determine the 
feasibility to sustain the program. Other important considerations might include logistical 
support, budgetary requirements, and operational testing.  
A further deficiency inside Japan’s bureaucracy, and a characteristic of Japan’s 
work culture in general, is that information is not widely shared between organizations, 
leading to decisions based on limited information.127
 
The various sub-organizations of 
Japan’s bureaucracy are stove piped to the point of minimizing collaboration and 
coordination between departments. There is thus the risk of poor decisions being made on 
the basis on inadequate analysis and input. The other consequence is that new ideas do 
not flow between different organizations. It can therefore be assumed that Japan’s 
bureaucracy is operating at low efficiency because problems and solutions are not 
communicated across the board. Sugai asserts that the MOD in particular must transition 
into a joint culture where interaction is maximized.128
 
One exemplar of such a culture 
might be a weekly interdepartmental hotwash meeting where information is shared across 
the board on how to improve processes based on what is working and what isn’t. 
When it comes to bad decisions, none is more problematic than corruption. On 
issues regarding defense, there are deep ties between officials from the MOD and the 
major defense industries. This may be confusing because the previous paragraphs 
identified a lack of collaboration between the ministries and non-government 
organizations. The deep ties mentioned above are exclusive to the MOD and defense 
industries and do not apply to the bureaucracy as a whole. Such collusion might not be 
surprising considering that Japan has a culture where large portions of retired JSDF 
officials join the defense industry after retirement. This leads to backdoor deal-making 
between industry leaders who bribe MOD officials for defense contracts. Hughes 
describes the term “amakudari  (literally “descent from heaven”), or placing of retired 
bureaucrats and uniformed officers on the boards of companies.”129
 
Some of the most 
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prominent cases that Hughes points out include: 1) a 1998 contracting scandal in which 
heads of the JDA allowed contractors to manipulate a defense contract; 2) a 2006 scandal 
in which Defense Facilities Administration Agency illegally conspired with private 
companies for a defense contract; and most famously 3) a 2007 case in which former 
MOD vice-minister Moriya was caught accepting ¥12m from a major company to grant 
an engine contract.130
 
The Moriya case was a wakeup call that revealed the sheer level of 
networking between bureaucrats and industry, and it prompted the MOD to take 
action.131 Throughout the investigation it was revealed that hundreds of former high-
ranking officers in the JSDF had transferred to high-profile companies like Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries.132
 
Although there have been reform efforts to combat this problem, the 
underlying problem, as Hughes notes, is that “Japan faces a problem of essentially 
structural corruption due to the relatively young retirement age and delayed pensions, by 
international standards, of Ministry of Defense bureaucrats and JSDF officers, and 
contractors seeking to offer re-employment in return for information on defence 
procurement.”133
 
Corruption of this kind undermines not only the integrity of Japan’s 
bureaucrats, but also the legitimacy of other decisions, not to mention the faith of the 
public. In terms of national defense, critical decisions on the weapons systems contracts 
should be strictly based on performance and economics. Decisions based on favoritism or 
loyalty to a certain faction can negatively affect national security. 
Although the 2013 NDPG has successfully passed, it is not an end-all policy, and 
there are sure to be continued debates and disagreements on its application from many 
sides. For example, the NDPG states, “Japan will contribute even more proactively in 
securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving 
its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”134
 
With the 
broad nature of this statement, there are looming questions as to the extent of the JSDF’s 
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deployment in joint international operations. What constitutes peacekeeping operations? 
What is the line drawn between peacekeeping and offensive combat operations? What 
level of offensive operations by the JSDF constitutes self-defense? How many stealth 
fighters are required to maintain adequate security within Japan’s airspace? There are 
many more policy decisions to be made, and Japan’s bureaucracy is far from unified 
when it comes to the future of its defense. This is not to say that effective policies cannot 
be passed and implemented. However, with so many officials with different interests 
involved in policy-making, and with the legacy of suppressed influence of the JDA, 
further decisions on the application of the NDPG will face obstacles, which at the very 
will least slow down the process. Furthermore, the process and culture of decision-
making inside the bureaucracy is a recipe for inefficiency. Lastly, collusion between 
defense officials and bureaucrats greatly undermines the legitimacy of officials in high 
positions. 
C. CHALLENGES OF JAPAN’S CABINET 
With the successful publishing of the 2013 NDPG, there may be a general 
assumption that Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet will have no opposition in carrying 
out their defense objectives. While it is true that major milestones have been completed, 
there are powerful forces both domestically and internationally that will present stiff 
challenges for the administration going forward. Most salient is the post-war legacy of 
antimilitaristic pacifism, through which Abe will continue to face opposition from both 
the public and inside his cabinet. Also, any proposed change to defense policy is 
dependent on getting buy-in from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The CLB is the 
lead organization in interpreting laws, and thus can be a legal challenge for the prime 
minister. Finally, the NDPG presents a major political risk to Japan in the international 
relations arena because its neighbors are suspicious and fearful of Japan’s militarism.  
1. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) 
Despite their somewhat discreet stature and lack of decision-making authority, 
Japan’s CLB is an agency of experts that wields enormous influence as the prime 
minister’s top advisory group. Particularly depended upon to interpret the law, it holds 
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significant power in shaping security policy because its judgment is given the highest 
legitimacy. The CLB has been, and will continue to remain a potential obstacle for the 
prime minister and cabinet in pushing policies, especially if there is disagreement. As 
Samuels describes, “by exhaustively and authoritatively reviewing all proposed policies 
and by issuing ‘unified government interpretations’ (tôitsu kenkai), the CLB effectively 
‘collateralizes’ the authority of bureaucrats, lawmakers, and jurists alike (keni o 
urazukeru mono).”135
 
With such authority, the CLB is an agency that has historically 
restrained the power of the prime minister. When it comes to interpretations on issues 
relating to national security, this agency holds greater power than even the Supreme 
Court, who has never challenged a CLB ruling.136 Therefore, Abe and future prime 
ministers wishing to push for securitization and NDPG objectives face the challenge of 
receiving support and consensus from the CLB.  
The CLB presents an obstacle for the prime minister and cabinet primarily 
because of its efforts to maintain the Yoshida Doctrine.137
 
As the NDPG is in line with 
increased securitization, the CLB in the future has the potential to put increased 
restriction on legal actions of the JSDF. Some examples include delaying the MSDF from 
deploying battleships in the aftermath of September 11th,138
 
and deeming it 
unconstitutional for the SDF to conduct operations alongside the U.S. military during the 
first Gulf War.139
 
Assuming that Japan remains on the current trajectory towards greater 
collective self-defense, Article 9 of the constitution will be further stretched and will 
again require CLB interpretations. The CLB particularly proved to be an obstacle for 
former Prime Minister Koizumi in pushing for interpretations of Article 9 on collective 
security, an effort which he officially gave up, “but added that ‘there is room for cautious 
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Prime Minister Abe in his first term also faced opposition 
from the CLB when pushing for Collective Self-Defense (CSD) operations by the SDF. 
The CLB responded with: “government believes that the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense exceeds the limit on self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the 
Constitution and is not permissible.”141 
Many would argue that the CLB is declining in power and that both Koizumi and 
Abe have used their power to pressure it to favor their agendas. While it is true that the 
prime minister now has greater leverage over the CLB, it retains Supreme Court-like 
authority when it comes to constitutional interpretations. Even though the CLB has 
recently sided with Abe’s agenda to use the SDF for CSD, it nonetheless imposed strict 
limitations. These are often overlooked. For example, as Oros points out, in response to 
Abe’s goals for increased international operations by the JSDF, “the CLB issued an 
interpretation that allowed for the JSDF to operate in ‘areas surrounding Japan’ outside 
Japanese territory––with the restriction that the JSDF could not operate in the air, land, or 
sea territory of another state.”142
 
The last part puts into question exactly what roles the 
JSDF can play, or if the right to CSD is even achieved. Oros further expands on the 
limitations on CSD directed by the CLB which “directs that such CSD actions would be 
undertaken in only extremely limited circumstances: only when not acting ‘threatens 
Japan’s survival’ and ‘when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the 
attack’ and, even then, that the JSDF is permitted ‘the use of force to the minimum extent 
necessary . . . in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.’”143
 
When reading these limitations, one must question the exact interpretation of “extremely 
limited circumstances,” or the probability of the JSDF ever encountering a situation 
where the nation’s survival is at stake.144
 
Taking this into consideration, it is reasonable 
to assume that the CLB’s decision to allow collective self-defense was only political, 
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because in reality, the operational environment will not allow the JSDF to practice CSD 
to the level requested by Abe. Even though the CLB seems to be more controlled by the 
prime minister today, this agency historically has significantly slowed Japan’s tilt 
towards the perceived path of normalization. Considering that the NDPG is a step 
towards normalization, getting buy-in from the CLB will continually be a challenge for 
the prime minister and cabinet. The mere fact that prime ministers consult the CLB on 
major political decisions when technically not required to goes to show that legitimacy is 
only gained by receiving its seal of approval. As Samuels explains, “Japan’s most 
conservative political leaders have never forgotten the constraints imposed by CLB 
interpretations, nor have they ever forgiven the CLB for playing upon divisions in the 
conservative camp and inserting itself so directly into the political debate.”145
 
2. The Roots of Pacifism 
Perhaps the greatest challenge for Abe and his cabinet in modernizing Japan’s 
defense and meeting the overall NDPG objectives is overcoming the nation’s embedded 
ideology of pacifism post-WWII. Japan’s society remains sensitive to and suspicious of 
any activities related to strengthening its defense. The historical memory of devastation 
that resulted from its militaristic past still resonates in a powerful way. Oros writes that 
non-militaristic ideas “did become hegemonic over time,” and that these has become 
Japan’s “strategic culture.”146 Despite Japan’s heightened sense of vulnerability due to 
growing security threats in recent years, the forces of pacifism reinforced by tragic war 
memories are prevalent in all aspects of Japanese society, and will prove difficult to 
overcome. In fact, one might argue that in Japan, debates over national security are not 
about whether to increase military capabilities, but more about stretching the limits of the 
already established Japanese identity of pacifism.147 That is, what is negotiable is not 
antimilitarism itself, but only how far it can be pushed. Japan’s security strategy by and 
large is still tied to the Yoshida Doctrine of depending on the U.S. alliance for defense 
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while focusing on economic growth. The challenge for Abe and future prime ministers 
seeking to enhance defense capabilities to support the NDPG will be to garner support 
from the peace-loving public.  
A massive literature on Japan’s path to normalization in the last decade argues 
that continuous reinterpretations of Article 9 are gradually chipping away the limits of 
self-defense and that the LDP under Abe will eventually revise the constitution. This 
thesis is not directly concerned with the debate on Japan’s normalization, nor does it 
argue that Japan will not normalize its military. However, the issue of normalization is 
directly correlated to this thesis’ discussion on the challenges of Japan’s cabinet in 
achieving the NDPG, because the NDPG is tied to the current administration’s goals of a 
more collective self-defense, particularly to increase joint operations with the U.S. While 
it is true that the LDP has been moving towards normalization with the DPJ also having 
moved more to the right, the building blocks that have put restraints on defense for 
almost 70 years are still powerful today. This restraint on defense is not only rooted in 
Article 9 of the constitution, but also further reinforced by internal laws that Japan’s 
leaders have put into place. Therefore, to understand the power of postwar pacifism, it is 
important to review and understand these internal laws. Japan scholar Christopher 
Hughes provides them sequentially in Table 5: 
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Table 5.   Japan’s Internal Military Restrictions148 
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These extraordinary limitations on defense are arguably unmatched by any other 
nation. Although some of these restrictions have been lifted throughout the years, they 
still exist in the ideological sense and, at the very least, have slowed Japan in both 
defense modernization and in interpretations of defense policy. 
One interesting aspect of Japanese society is that despite recognizing growing 
threats in the region, the public through the years still fails to clearly support an increased 
defensive posture. For example, in July of 1988, majority of participants believed there 
was a strong possibility that Japan would be involved in armed combat in the future; 
however, “only 3.6 percent said they would join the Self-Defense Forces in that event 
with 28.3 percent declaring they would ‘support’ the SDF.”149
 
A decade later, in 1999, 
Oros points out an incident in which Japan’s MSDF fired warning shots at four unknown 
ships that entered into Japanese maritime territory; after the incident, public polling 
revealed that one-third of respondents opposed firing shots even when Japanese territory 
was breached.150 Moreover, in 2004 SAGE polls, almost half felt that war was unjustified 
even when attacked, while less than a quarter felt that a stronger military led to peace.151 
The most compelling data in these polls, as Oros points out, was that 85.9 percent felt 
diplomacy was the best method to avoid war, while emphasizing the importance of 
international institutions.152
 
If we fast-forward to the 2013/2014 period, we see no major 
changes in public opinion on the acceptable use of the JSDF. Specifically, in regards to 
opinions on the right of collective self-defense, Oros notes that “only a tiny minority 
supported ‘fighting on the front lines in combat with the United States (7 and 5 percent, 
respectively, so a decline year on year); only 17 percent of those polled thought it was 
acceptable for the JSDF to ‘provide weapons and fuels support to the U.S. military 
overseas’ (down from 20 percent in 2013).”153
 
Furthermore, additional surveys reveal 
that only 30 percent support strengthening the JSDF, while half are opposed to overseas 
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deployments.154 The inconsistency is that despite general public consensus on potential 
threats, the public does not support a more aggressive military stance. Even though there 
is a growing sense of insecurity due to North Korea’s nuclear/missile capability and 
China’s militarization in the South China Sea, the public does not believe that this 
justifies a more offensive oriented use of the SDF. This sentiment is reflected in another 
2014 poll collecting opinions on the best method to deal with the growing Chinese threat, 
in which half the participants believed that increased diplomacy with its neighbors was 
key; meanwhile, only 5.2 percent emphasized the utility of the U.S. alliance.155
 
The 
decline is a worrisome trend because disputes with China have only escalated since 2010, 
especially over the Senkaku Islands and the massive buildup on the reefs of the South 
China Sea. This poses a significant challenge for the Abe administration, which in the 
long run must convey to the Japanese public a justification for the SDF’s conducting 
more aggressive joint operations with the U.S. military in pursuit of a “dynamic joint 
defense force.”156 As in any democratic nation, Japan’s public holds enormous influence 
in shaping defense policy.  
As Satoh and Van de Velde argue, “the absence of a clear constitutional definition 
of ‘self-defense’ means public opinion will remain a major determinant in the formation 
of Japanese defense policy.”157
 
Ambiguity in the definition of self-defense is an 
important point given numerous reinterpretations over the years. It is reasonable to argue 
that continuous reinterpretations only delegitimize the government, thereby giving public 
sentiment greater authority in determining defense policy.  
A significant and growing threat to Japan’s security is posed by North Korea, 
which in 2016 conducted another underground nuclear test in addition to multiple 
ground-based and SLBM missile launches that landed directly in Japan’s exclusive 
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economic zone. In response, as part of his speech to the UN General Assembly, Prime 
Minister Abe delivered the following statement: 
This year alone, North Korea has launched a total of 21 ballistic missiles. 
In addition, it claims to have successfully detonated a nuclear warhead in a 
test on September 9. . . . This series of launches of missiles and a 
detonation of a warhead does change the landscape completely. . . 
We must therefore respond to  this in a manner entirely distinct 
from our responses thus far. We must concentrate our strengths and 
thwart North Korea’s plans.158 
North Korea’s increasing threats are, of course, reflected in the NDPG, which 
emphasizes strengthening of the alliance to deter such threats.159
 
However, as this thesis 
asserts, there is a great disparity between public opinion and the official position of the 
government, which puts into question the likelihood of success of this measure. Despite 
the proximity of such dangers near its territory, the public remains steadfast in its anti-
militaristic views. One might expect that only a direct attack on Japan’s home soil 
causing massive casualties might reverse this trend – and even then, one might still 
question whether the public would push for a more offensive SDF rather than relying on 
the U.S. to take action. 
Despite the increasing voices proclaiming Japan’s rise to militarism, particularly 
with the Constitutional re-interpretation now allowing for CSD, it is important to peel the 
onion back and read the new policy. As previously mentioned, the CLB ruling on CSD 
determined that the use of force is only permissible when survival is at stake.160
Furthermore, Japan’s internal defense laws put strict limitations on the applications of 
force. First, the term “use of force” is permitted only under extreme situations using the 
least amount of firepower as possible.161
 
This is, of course, after it is determined that an 
ally of Japan is in imminent danger.  
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The massive protests that erupted in late 2015 in Tokyo in response to the 
decision to reinterpret the definition of collective self-defense illustrates the strong 
opposition that still exists despite clear existential threats. As a shift in public opinion is 
highly improbable, the legitimacy of Abe may decline. In fact, as Oros points out, 
“approval for the Abe cabinet slumped by almost ten percentage points in the first month 
after the legislation was introduced, to 37.7 percent.”162 Ultimately, democratic leaders in 
Japan simply cannot push their agenda without attaining legitimacy from the people. 
Figure 5 illustrates the declining support for Prime Minister Abe in recent years. 
Figure 5.  Changes in Support Percentage for the Abe Cabinet (2012–2015)163 
 
3. Geopolitical Risks 
Aside from public backlash, another challenge for the cabinet upon increasing 
defense capabilities would be backlash from its neighbors, especially China. With 
historical memory still alive and well, nations that suffered from Japanese militarism 
during the war and occupation are still suspicious and fearful of perceived Japanese 
militarism and are willing to use this fear politically. Therefore, in attempting to fulfill 
the NDPG, Abe faces the difficulty of managing foreign policy to tilt in Japan’s favor as 
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well. With China and Japan increasing their defensive capabilities, power politics and the 
game of offensive realism are at play.  
As alluded to throughout this paper, relations with China have deteriorated 
considerably in recent years amid China’s buildup in the South China Sea and, especially, 
its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. There have been incidents of provocative 
Chinese behavior in the Senkakus’ surrounding waters since 2010, with aggressive aerial 
maneuvers and radar targeting of ships, both of which have been condemned by the 
Japanese government.164 The NDPG specifically points to Chinese activities in the 
maritime domain, stating, “as Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it 
will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concern over 
regional and global security.”165
 
The verbiage “great concern” represents the highest 
sense of urgency in Japanese foreign policy documents.  
A large portion of Japan’s defense modernization effort is in response to the 
growing Chinese threat. These two nations are regional rivals. Herman writes, “China 
sees Japan not only as an economic rival and an obstacle to China’s rise to regional and 
world hegemony, but also as a potential competitor in the world defense and arms 
market, one with important comparative advantages in quality and reliability, as well as 
in advanced high-tech areas.”166
 
This is, of course, exacerbated by the fact that there is 
historical enmity dating back over a century, based on the Sino-Japanese War, the 
occupation of Manchuria in WWII, and Japan’s overall war atrocities committed during 
this period. We now see theory of realism playing out, with each side trying to match or 
exceed the other’s military capability, which could potentially lead to an arms race. This 
presents a serious dilemma for Abe and his cabinet, because increasing Japan’s military 
capabilities might only result in China doing the same; and it is becoming ever clearer 
that Japan cannot compete with China in terms of defense spending. Figure 6 depicts 
China’s sheer dominance over Japan in military spending during the last couple of 
decades. 
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The other issue to consider is that China’s military rise is in response to 
confronting the U.S. military more than Japan. Therefore, managing the U.S.-Japanese 
alliance is another consideration that Japan’s cabinet must navigate, and one that adds to 
the dilemma. Oros argues that China views the U.S.-Japan alliance as a threat to its 
interests in the region.167
 
 
Figure 6.  Asia’s Military Spending Comparison168 
   
The bigger issue is the economic interdependence between Japan and China as 
they rank second and third largest in terms of world economic power. Despite a recent 
decrease, China is still the top source of foreign direct investment for the Japanese.169
 
Additionally, tourism between the two nations has skyrocketed with more than 4.5 
million visitors traveling between the two countries in 2013.170 The question remains as 
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to how Japan’s defense modernization efforts impact the economic relationship. There is 
no doubt that commerce between Japan and China is highly beneficial to the economic 
health of both countries. As illustrated in Figure 7, the sheer amount of trade that occurs 
between the two is enormous: around $340 billion in 2014, with China serving as Japan’s 
top trading partner.171
 
Economics is obviously a major factor in shaping foreign policy 
towards the region, which puts the Abe administration in a bind.  




The previous chapter discussed the challenges to Japan’s defense export market, 
one of which is the reluctance of companies to participate due to fears of their arms 
getting in the wrong hands. Similarly, Japanese defense companies might also be 
reluctant to export defense products for fear of Chinese opposition. There are two 
possible scenarios that Japanese companies may fear: 1) a boycott imposed by the 
                                                 
171 Peter Drysdale, “The Geo-Economic potential of the China–Japan Relationship,” East Asia 
Forum, September 28, 2015, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/28/the-geo-economic-potential-of-the-
china-japan-relationship/. 
172 Source: Michael Markey, “Extended Deterrence and Japan: How Much is Enough?” Center for 
Global Security Research, accessed May 25, 2017, 6, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Japan.pdf. 
 57 
Chinese government of all Japanese goods coming in; 2) resistance from Japan’s 
neighbors toward buying Japanese weapons systems due to fears of upsetting China.173
 
Although such a scenario is related to the defense industry, it adds to the complexity 
faced by Japan’s government in its diplomatic approach to China. Although unrelated to 
Japan, one good example is China’s recent boycott of one of South Korea’s top 
companies, Lotte, in retaliation for the deployment of THAAD missile. As is also true for 
the U.S., the relationship with China is a complicated one because China is neither friend 
nor foe.  
D. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES INSIDE THE JAPANESE SELF-
DEFENSE FORCE 
As the organization entrusted to carry out the defense objectives of Japan, the 
health, quality, and operational readiness of the JDSF is pivotal to carrying out the 
NDPG’s broader security objectives. Created in 1954, the JSDF has evolved into a 
professional force with significant capabilities. All three branches – Maritime, Ground, 
and Air Self-Defense Forces have seen major upgrades to their defense equipment 
designed for the 21st century. The JSDF possesses some of most technologically 
advanced systems among all the world’s militaries, and is continually upgrading its 
defense equipment to match opponents in the region. Despite its growth and progress 
throughout the years, though, the JSDF is not without major problems and challenges. 
These include a lack of combat readiness/training, recruitment gaps, and restrictions on 
its use of force. Without efforts to address these issues, the JSDF’s efforts in responding 
to complex security threats and in joint operations with the U.S. military will be greatly 
hampered. 
1. Lack of Training and Experience 
Although positive gains have been made throughout the years, the JSDF’s combat 
readiness is uncertain because of its lack of real-world experience and training. This is, of 
course, not surprising considering Japan’s legal constraints and dependence on the U.S. 
Although Article 9 plays the clearest role here, there are other internal deficiencies that 
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must be addressed. Maintaining combat readiness is especially critical now, given the 
newly interpreted rule on CSD and the overall objective of becoming a greater partner 
with the U.S. Today, there is a shortage of joint U.S.-Japan military exercises and an 
overall lack of training within the JSDF. Yamaguchi contends that “training is sporadic” 
within the military, with specialized units such as the “Special Forces Group” the only 
ones to maintain adequate proficiency, and further adds that realistic combat training is 
lacking across the entire force.174
 
While it is true that the JSDF is conducting more 
operations in the realm of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief 
(HADR) and has contribute to many U.S.-led coalition operations, these remain minimal 
compared to other nations. In fact, “the number of Japanese military personnel 
contributing to UN operations is only 266, which ranks 47th among UN member 
states.”175
 
This is an important point because readiness is only achieved during 
peacetime. Green et al. point out that the alliance “lacks the command and control 
elements necessary for a rapid combined and joint response to potential crisis or 
conflicts,” and advocates for a “joint operational command.”176 This is an accurate 
assessment, considering that the scope of alliance is vital to maintaining peace and 
stability in the region. As Japan’s military gradually becomes more offensively oriented, 
training must also shift in the direction of more joint live combat training with the U.S. in 
order to prepare the forces for a real-world incident.  
Despite these training deficiencies, there is reason to be optimistic, because joint 
exercises are increasing in frequency. However, much more progress is needed. Japan 
still lacks a robust system and joint exercises are still not a common practice. This is in 
contrast with the multiple annual joint exercises that occur every year between the ROK 
and U.S. Exercises such as KEY RESOLVE on the Korean peninsula test U.S.-ROK 
capabilities based on realistic scenarios.  
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Similarly, there is a lack of joint operability among the three branches of the 
JSDF. As Japan’s military has not yet developed a joint training concept, the ASDF, 
MSDF, and GSDF traditionally operate independently of each other. For instance, in 
training for coastline defense, the ASDF practices combat air patrol without coordinating 
with the GSDF to provide close air support. Newsham points to the example of the 
annual Mt. Fuji military exercise, in which last year the JDSF put on an impressive public 
show demonstrating an “island re-taking” drill.177
 
Newsham also notes the opinion of 
military experts who conclude that while the exercise demonstrates the JSDF’s kinetic 
capability, the JSDF does not, in reality, actually have the capability to retake an island, 
due to a lack of joint operability.178
 
As seen with Japan’s ministries’ not always working 
together, the JSDF suffers from a culture lacking inter-service cooperation. Technological 
advancement has changed warfare in the 21st century into a joint operation. Practicing 
joint operations is thus especially important for a comparatively small force like the 
JSDF, since its success depends on maximizing all resources. Only through inter-service 
collaboration can the SDF reach its maximum potential. This is exactly what the NDPG 
calls for.  
The lack of joint training is partly due to a misallocation of the budget and lack of 
focus on the needs of the SDF personnel. While the defense budget commits heavily to 
acquiring advanced weapons platforms and maintenance of current systems, it devotes 
less attention to promoting quality of life and training opportunities for the SDF. 
Newsham, with this in mind, calls for increased spending on training, wages, and 
housing.179 Instead, the 2017 defense budget emphasizes quality of life for the U.S. 
military by devoting ¥3.5 billion for the Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
(SACO).180 While it is vitally important to provide better infrastructure for U.S. forces 
and to modernize Japan’s defense equipment, investing in Japan’s own SDF personnel is 
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equally important, if not more so: what good are all the most advanced military platforms 
in the world without enough qualified personnel to operate them? 
 This is not to say joint operations are not emphasized in the budget papers. In 
fact, these do state commitment to continuing of many of existing joint US-Japanese 
exercises related to island defense and various other HADR-type operations. However, 
Japan must now prepare for more offensive-type operations designed to prepare the force 
for direct attacks during combat, which is especially relevant to practicing collective self-
defense. 
2. Limited Use of Force 
With training and combat readiness being major issues, an even greater obstacle 
the JSDF faces is limitations on the use of force. Commanders must adhere to strict and 
ambiguous rules of engagement during real-world operations. As Wright describes, “a 
defense-only mindset naturally skews all planning processes, creativity, and outcomes 
towards that situation.”181 This is an important assessment often overlooked. An effective 
military operation plan is one in which commanders have the leverage and flexibility to 
picture multiple scenarios and adapt to different situations. If not afforded this 
opportunity, commanders have no choice but to adopt a reactive rather than proactive 
mindset. Therefore, JDSF leaders are faced with the difficult task of formulating an 
effective strategy without breaking the rules of engagement. This is exacerbated by what 
Wright describes as a “cumbersome chain of command” in which authority to take action 
must first be vetted through civilian leadership.182
 
This is most problematic in the context 
of the newly established right to collective self-defense. If and when the JDSF encounters 
a situation in which the use of offensive force is necessary, commanders will first need to 
request permission through the MOD and Diet. Time, though, is not a luxury in combat 
operations. Commanders need the latitude to make decisions quickly based on their 
assessment of the situation. A delay in such decisions can be costly. According to one 
JSDF officer, “one of our biggest worries in the SDF is being unable to face a threat that 
                                                 
181 Wright, “Japan Use of Force,” 35. 
182 Ibid. 
 61 
has just emerged in a timely manner, according to the current policy . . . It’s a little late 
when the missile is flying towards you.”183
 
E. RECRUITING PROBLEMS 
As Japan has adopted a pacifist and anti-militaristic culture in the post-war era, 
the SDF struggles to attract applicants, in terms of both quality and quantity. As 
previously mentioned, Japan is a civilian-dominant society in which top elites enter the 
bureaucracy or join top-rated firms. This is not to say there are no high-quality personnel 
in the ranks of the SDF, but there remains a big difference in prestige between, say, the 
Japanese Defense Academy and the University of Tokyo. As Chinworth writes, “the most 
promising college graduates intent on a government career set their sights for [non-
defense] ministries instead of a state agency tainted by its wartime legacy.”184
  
Related to this problem is a lack of social interaction between the JSDF and the 
public, and in turn a lack of public exposure to or information about the JSDF.185
 
The 
public is very much in the dark about life inside the SDF, nor is there great interest. 
Advertising is minimal. This is unlike the U.S., whose military bases devote significant 
effort to the military-public relationship through their public affairs offices and 
organizing public events. Also, as previously mentioned, Japan’s public does not 
necessarily support increased militarization despite acknowledging growing threats. 
Therefore, it remains questionable whether Japanese citizens will rally to serve their 
country when a major crisis occurs. In the United States, September 11th saw a rise in 
patriotism, with a record number of volunteers joining the military; one cannot assume 
that a similar scenario would play out in Japan. Lastly, recruiting might only become 
more difficult in the future given Japan’s declining population, since this will further 
limit the pool of qualified applicants.  
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The recruitment problem is reflected in the 2017 defense budget as the MOD is 
devoting ¥800 million to the “Enhancement of advertisement and readiness for 
recruitment to deal with the increasingly severe recruitment environment,” which 
includes the use of media and video technology.186 This illustrates awareness of the 
problem, but also the severity of the problem in the first place. The JSDF will likely 
never be able to compete with the civilian sector in recruiting the best and the brightest. 
The JSDF can, however, narrow the gap with more public outreach initiatives. 
Revamping the recruitment process is critical to national security, because the SDF must 
focus increasingly on the quality of its force. Modernizing equipment is only one part of 
the equation. Ultimately, a strong military needs capable people to operate advanced 
equipment and to effectively execute its strategies during contingencies.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated major challenges within Japan’s government 
organizations and society to modernizing and strengthening Japan’s defense toward 
accomplishing the goals of the NDPG. Japan’s government is without doubt one of the 
most efficient among democracies. However, it still faces bureaucratic/organizational 
deficiencies and fierce differences in opinion, especially where defense issues are 
concerned, and even corruption between MOD and industry officials. Meanwhile, 
Japan’s anti-militaristic identity drives powerful public opposition that counters efforts to 
strengthen national defense. Despite the growing voices that predict normalization, the 
public is still wary. This chapter also discussed the potentially negative impact on Sino-
Japanese relations from Japan’s strengthened defense architecture, given the economic 
interdependence between of the two countries and potential Chinese backlash. Also, the 
historical memory of Japanese aggression leaves its neighbors (especially South Korea 
and China), fearful and suspicious of any militarization or rise of nationalism in Japan. 
Lastly, this chapter pinpointed weak links inside the JSDF that might undermine its 
ability to carry out the mission. These various problems and challenges within and faced 
by Japan’s government are by no means a showstopper for NDPG execution, but they do 
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present deficiencies that leaders must address. As discussed more specifically below, the 
solutions would likely require fundamental domestic changes and both short-term and 
long-term national strategies that maximize all instruments of power. 
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In this final chapter, I will summarize the main topics, arguments, and overall 
research covered in this thesis. Additionally, since earlier chapters discussed the obstacles 
Japan faces in meeting the NDPG, this conclusion will propose specific strategies and 
areas of improvement that might give Japan the best chance to work around these 
obstacles, particularly in the technology realm. These strategies include: 1) strengthening 
the U.S.-Japan alliance; 2) marketing technologies in which Japan has a comparative 
advantage, which include lasers, niche defense-related components, robotics, and space 
assets; and 3) bureaucratic reforms that improve collaboration with outside organizations. 
These strategies/recommendations are not meant to provide conclusive answers to the 
problems, nor can I guarantee they will succeed or be even implemented. I do, however, 
assert that these are the most practical and feasible strategies, with the highest likelihood 
of success. Finally, this thesis concludes by discussing future implications for whether, 
how, and, when Japan might be able to meet the NDPG objectives. 
A. SUMMARY 
Amid great changes in East Asia, particularly China’s military build-up and North 
Korea’s ever-increasing belligerency, the military posture of Japan is changing as well. 
Japan’s rise in military strength and Abe’s move towards normalization – and the 
analytical narratives emphasizing these—can be seen clearly by examining Japan’s 
National Defense Program Guidelines, which outline in detail Japan’s security strategy in 
terms of concerns, priorities, and objectives going forward. Popular narratives 
surrounding the NDPG emphasize the changes this plan represents, but pay less attention 
to the problems and challenges involved. This thesis has investigated these problems and 
challenges, examining specifically those inside and faced by defense industry and the 
government. These include both internal deficiencies and outside factors that might 
prevent or slow Japan’s efforts.  
While Japan’s industry is no doubt world class technologically, it also has major 
shortfalls and limitations that must be confronted. Japanese industry lacks kokusanka 
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ability – that is, the ability to indigenously develop its own weapons systems. Kokusanka 
saw serious deterioration after the destructive defeat of WWII, upon which the U.S. 
occupation enforced a ban on weapons development. By developing close ties with the 
U.S., and with the Yoshida Doctrine winning out politically, Japan also developed 
dependence upon American weapons. Although there are some impressive kokusanka 
platforms, Japan’s defense equipment is still largely derived from U.S. foreign military 
sales, technology transfers, and co-development projects. This lack of kokusanka puts 
Japan’s long-term security strategy in jeopardy, because it suppresses the development of 
Japan’s defense production and R&D and thereby limits the ability to deter adversaries. 
The real challenge is contending with the forces that prevent kokusanka, including 
mandates for dual-use (military and civilian) application of technology and continued 
U.S. pressure to buy American weapons systems or jointly co-develop them. 
Japan’s budget constraints are another problem that the defense industry will have 
to contend with. The one percent of GDP limit on defense spending is incompatible with 
defense modernization, because it restricts the ability to maintain a healthy acquisitions 
and logistical support base. This is especially relevant for Japan’s commitment to high-
tech purchases that require extensive sustainment capabilities. The budget constraint is 
only projected to worsen in the future with Japan’s ballooning debt, and in light of the 
massive funding needed for future social security and pension payments amid a rapidly 
aging population. The saimu futan koi method of deferred payment will likely exacerbate 
the problem by only increasing obligated payments during a budget crisis, which could 
put future defense purchases in jeopardy. Lastly, while Japan’s defense budget may have 
technically risen on paper, it has actually declined when factoring in the depreciation of 
the yen and the larger portion of the increase committed to the costs associated with 
SACO. 
With regard to Japanese government capabilities, this thesis argued that Japan’s 
bureaucratic system suffers from inefficiencies, bottlenecks in decision-making, and 
corruption. These problems can be attributed to Japan’s history, organizational culture, 
and domestic politics. With the three biggest players the (MOFA, METI, and MOD) 
approaching the issue of defense from different perspectives, gridlock continues to be a 
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problem. With the security situation becoming more complex in Asia, Japan’s 
bureaucrats will face tougher challenges in formulating defensive policy, especially with 
the current trajectory clearly indicating a prioritization on defense modernization. This 
will only complicate Japan’s domestic politics because it will impact issues like foreign 
relations, the economy, and national budget. This is a formula for even more gridlock 
within the ministries and puts greater uncertainty on how the NDPG will be carried out 
amid the need for more complicated decisions in the future. 
Although Prime Minster Abe and the LDP-dominant cabinet are pushing for a 
more proactive stance on defense, this thesis has argued that this pursuit will still require 
careful navigation around difficult barriers. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau represents 
one of these barriers as the primary advisor to the prime minister in interpreting laws. 
Having already gained legitimacy in Japan’s society, it holds great power in determining 
Japan’s defense policies. Any future decisions pertaining defense laws will likely not 
pass without the approval of the CLB, which still maintains significant autonomy despite 
recent signs of vulnerability to pressure from political leadership. 
This thesis has also emphasized the enduring power of pacifism in Japan’s 
society. Public pressure is already putting great stress on the Abe administration’s 
perceived path toward normalization and will continue to do so for future administrations 
who pursue the same agenda. The public does not necessarily support a stronger military, 
despite growing existential threats. Therefore, the question remains as to how far Abe (of 
future prime ministers) can push before public backlash becomes too much to handle. 
Currently, Abe and the LDP are walking a fine line with the newly established legal right 
of the JSDF to practice collective self-defense.  
 Abe and his cabinet also run the risk of agitating Japan’s neighbors, who 
historically are wary of any form of militarism inside Japan. This problem is most 
applicable to Japan’s relationship with China, who many Japanese view as seeking 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. On the one hand, it is necessary to respond to 
China’s military architecture; on the other hand, strengthening Japan’s own military, both 
in terms of hardware and rules of engagement threatens the relationship. As Japan’s 
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economic health is closely correlated with its commerce with China, risking this dynamic 
relationship is something the Diet will have to seriously assess. 
Finally, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces themselves face significant weaknesses. 
Although the JSDF is a highly capable fighting force, it is also an organization that is not 
adequately tested, because combat experience and realistic training events have been 
minimal. Also, the JSDF still abides by the strictest rules of engagement by which 
commanders have to request permission through the civilian chain of command before 
engaging in offensive actions. This greatly reduces the latitude with which commanders 
can assess and respond to threats in a real combat situation, and can reduce the likelihood 
of mission success. Finally, the SDF struggles to recruit enough high-quality applicants 
because they cannot compete with the civilian sector. In a civilian-dominant society, the 
vast majority of elites join the bureaucracy or top business firms. This is greatly 
exacerbated by the fact that little interaction occurs between the JSDF and the public, 
limiting information about or exposure to the JSDF. 
B. STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
The U.S.-Japan alliance is vital to Japan’s national defense, and strengthening it is 
the most effective strategy to mitigate the obstacles identified in this thesis. The 
following three sub-sections will examine the current state of the alliance and discuss the 
most comprehensive strategies to strengthen it. I will recommend practical strategies to 
improve military interoperability between USFJ and JSDF and discuss the opportunities 
and benefits for Japan if it partners with the U.S. through the Third Offset Strategy. I will 
justify why these strategies are sound options to confronting deficiencies and explain why 
they benefit the overall long-term security for both countries. 
1. Current State of the Alliance  
Japan’s strategic partnership and alliance with the United States remains strong 
today, with both countries pledging not only to maintain the alliance, but also to 
strengthen it by increasing joint operability to respond to new threats. Despite Japan’s 
concerns during the U.S. election cycle, President Trump has stated his commitment to 
maintaining a strong partnership between the two countries. On Japan’s side, the NDPG 
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specifically states that “the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s 
national security.”187 By all indications, the U.S.-Japanese alliance appears to be stronger 
than ever, with multiple plans to build on the concepts of the “Dynamic Joint Defense 
Force”188 and collective self-defense.  
The Mutual Defense Guidelines (MDG) are the official policy providing guidance 
on roles related to the operational relationship between the two countries.189 The 2015 
version of the MDG states that the relationship going forward “broadens the scope of 
functional cooperation to include ISR, air and missile defense, maritime security, space 
and cyber, peacekeeping operations, partner capacity building, HA/DR, and 
noncombatant evacuations (NEOs).”190 All these plans are steps in the right direction to 
restructure the alliance for the new security environment and to operationally prepare the 
JSDF for future missions. 
2. Strengthening JSDF-USFJ Interoperability 
The U.S.-Japan alliance has strong initiatives to build on in preparation for 
challenges in the 21st century. One deficiency mentioned in the previous chapter is that 
the JSDF lacks the ability to work jointly with the U.S. military due to lack of experience 
and poor communications with USFJ. Strengthening interoperability between the two 
militaries is one strategy leaders can focus on to mitigate this deficiency. What are some 
practical steps that can be taken? If the USFJ and JSDF truly plan to embark upon the 
missions listed above, establishing a joint command is one logical step because, this can 
enhance the synergy between the two militaries. A good model is the Combined Republic 
of Korea-United States Forces Korea Command (CFC) headquartered in Seoul, South 
Korea. There, top commanders and staff offices from all branches work together jointly 
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in highly sophisticated facilities. This allows for effective planning for exercises and 
rapid response to real world contingencies.  
Second, USFJ and the JSDF should also conduct joint exercises on a more regular 
basis and at larger scales. More important, these exercises should encompass a joint 
warfighting concept that merges the efforts of all the service components to include air, 
land, maritime, and special operations forces. Currently, the JDSF is mostly involved in 
joint exercises on a service specific basis. For example, the JASDF periodically trains 
with the USAF in the well-known RED FLAG exercise. The GSDF also trains with the 
U.S. Marine Corps in California to improve amphibious assault capabilities. While these 
exercises provide unmatched combat training opportunities that greatly hone tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, these skills need to be applied in a joint service environment. 
Additionally, as Japan seeks to be a more equal and proactive partner, the JSDF 
should increasingly take the lead, not follow the U.S.’s lead, in both the planning and 
operational command of these exercises. This would require the JSDF itself to design 
exercise scenarios based on realistic threats. Additionally, civilian leadership and 
commanders should test their communication capabilities during these exercises. Once 
strengths and vulnerabilities are identified, a robust chain of command structure can be 
established, so that commanders can make sound decisions on a timely basis. The bottom 
line is that JDSF commanders and senior government officials, both those within MOD 
and the Prime Minister himself, should establish clear communication mechanisms that 
eliminate ambiguity. Since collective self-defense is now technically legal, there must be 
a clear understanding of what the JDSF can and cannot do in specific scenarios.  
Third, with the NDPG stating that “Japan will continue to expand joint training 
and exercises,”191 another feasible plan to meet this objective is to increasingly co-locate 
SDF and USFJ military installations, in addition to establishing a combined headquarter. 
This initiative is already in the works but requires greater urgency. The Congressional 
Research Service reports that although there has been integration of some headquarter 
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buildings, “the two militaries do not share base facilities in Japan on a large scale.”192 
Co-locating operational bases can improve communication and unity because the two 
militaries will be in close proximity in an environment where joint exercises are only 
projected to increase in frequency. This would also increase the interaction between 
USFJ-JSDF forces and allows for informal cultural and social exchanges. This is an 
aspect often ignored. Alongside tactical and strategic elements, joint operability is also 
about developing social relationships from the lowest to the highest ranks. By building 
healthy relationships, the USFJ and JSDF can meld together effectively during real-world 
operations.  
Co-locating bases can potentially alleviate public opposition, another important 
obstacle this thesis discussed above, because it provides an opportunity to present a joint 
image to the public, especially in Okinawa. A joint presence can help reinforce the 
message that the strategic alliance between the two nations is critical for Japan’s defense 
and for regional security in Asia as a whole. Of course, the Japanese public is not 
unaware that the U.S. military is a key element of its security, but I argue that some 
public animosity towards the military, even in Okinawa, can be alleviated when local 
residents continually witness positive interactions between American and Japanese forces 
both socially and operationally. This effort will to need to be supported with more public 
outreach activities by both USFJ and the JSDF on a larger scale. 
The next question is whether both Japan and the U.S. can implement these 
changes, and, if so, why this hasn’t already happened. Some may question whether 
Japanese leaders are aware of or willing to take this approach. Evidence does exist, 
though, that some of these methods are already being implemented, especially with 
regard to increasing joint exercise and training events. Abe has expressed desire to 
participate more closely and proactively with the U.S. military, and the verbiage in the 
NDPG and the legalization of CSD in 2014 certainly reinforce these points. These 
indicators might give skeptics a certain amount of optimism that these strategies and
recommendations can become reality in the future. 
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3. Technology Partnership 
Another strategy to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance is greater partnership in the 
research and development of technology. Specifically, Japan should partner with the U.S. 
in the “third offset strategy.” This strategy can mitigate two of Japan’s obstacles 
identified in this thesis: 1) the relative inability to produce indigenous defense equipment 
(kokusanka), and 2) fiscal problems due to an aging population. Also, partnering with the 
U.S. in the technical realm not only provides Japan outlets to solve these problems, but 
can also be immensely beneficial for the U.S.’s technology and acquisitions base.  
While Japan and the U.S. possess some of the most sophisticated technologies in 
both the military and civilian sectors, the gap is narrowing as China and other 
competitors also develop rival systems. In 2014, the U.S. implemented the third offset 
strategy to ensure America’s continued conventional advantage in future conflicts. The 
focus areas for this strategy include extensive research to produce systems such as 
“advanced manned-unmanned systems operations, and network-enabled autonomous 
weapons and high speed projectiles.”193
 
The third offset strategy thus offers the 
opportunity for joint technological cooperation between the two nations. Japan is the 
perfect partner because its industries specialize in state-of-the-art component 
technologies that could greatly support such U.S. research agencies as the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. For example, Japan’s most advanced fields, such as 
robotics and fiber optics, could be the perfect lead-in to develop next-generation drones. 
It is a win-win situation because the Japanese defense industries and research agencies 
(particularly ATLA) can learn greatly from U.S. research, procurement, and acquisitions 
process, thereby growing their indigenous development capabilities. Such kokusanka can 
reinforce Japan’s ability to produce high tech weapons to meet NDPG objectives, and 
would allow Japan’s industries to gradually build the technical expertise it needs to 
produce weapons platforms in the future.  
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Tatsumi and Kennedy introduce argument about Japan’s need to collaborate: “due 
to an aging and declining population, coupled with an economy that has yet to pick up 
from two decades of economic stagnation, . . . Japan will have to rely on innovation, both 
to maintain its superiority in certain military and dual-use technology, and to 
collaborate with its allies and partners to maximize its limited defense resources.”194 
Innovation is indeed the most efficient strategy for a nation that needs to make up for 
fiscal problems. More importantly, the only path to match China’s military in strength is 
by gaining technological superiority, since it is unrealistic for Japan to match China in 
defense spending. What better opportunity is there than to learn the methodology from 
the nation with global weapons supremacy? Learning this methodology and combining it 
with Japan’s superior component technology is a logical step in the right direction.  
Of course, partnering with America’s third offset strategy is a complicated 
process that will involve considerable negotiations. The sensitivity of certain defense 
projects might also present security clearance and access issues. 
This thesis did argue that U.S. pressure to buy American systems is a major 
constraint to Japan’s pursuit of kokusanka, which suggests the counter argument that such 
collaboration is irrelevant if such pressure continues. However, working together on the 
third offset strategy will aid the defense export business for both countries, and therefore 
makes this effort a research and development partnership rather than a game of political 
pressure. Also, since Japan is a contributor to the development of new U.S. defense 
systems in this scenario, this entitles it to use the collaboration to indigenously develop 
its own defense equipment. 
C. EXPORT OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Overview 
Chapter two argued that Japan’s problem competing globally in the defense 
export business was primarily due to inexperience and the fact that the market is already 
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saturated with products from nations with more established export programs. However, 
since Japan does have comparative advantages in certain technologies, it should 
maximize these advantages by marketing them to international customers, now that it has 
removed barriers to weapons exports. This section details four of technologies/systems 
not yet discussed in this thesis: lasers, electronic niche components for the defense 
industry, robotics, and space technologies. This section will describe these technologies 
and explain why, and, how Japan’s comparative advantage can potentially develop the 
country into a major world exporter. In addition, this section will explain how these 
systems might help to alleviate some of the other challenges identified in this thesis. 
2. Lasers 
The idea of using laser weapon systems is no longer a futuristic concept but is 
actually being tested out in the field. Laser actually stands for “light amplification 
through the stimulated emission of radiation.” This technology works by creating a 
powerful, concentrated light beam focused in one direction.195 It is one element of  
“Directed-Energy Weapons” (DEW), which are described as “technologies that produce a 
beam of concentrated EM energy or atomic or subatomic particles,” which are then used 
“to damage or destroy adversary equipment, facilities, and personnel.”196 The U.S. is 
leading in this field with defense companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing already having 
tested on airborne, land-based, and sea-based platforms. Lockheed claims, “we have 
showcased many of these technologies in our 10-kilowatt prototype system, which has 
defeated small airborne and sea-based targets, and our 30-kilowatt test bed system, which 
has disabled a stationary truck target.”197  
Japan has also made advancements in laser technology. In 2015, the JMSDF’s 
AEGIS destroyer was equipped with a specific delivery platform designed for a laser gun, 
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while the Technical Research and Design Institute is currently working on a laser weapon 
for this direct purpose.198 Additionally, a noteworthy achievement can be attributed to a 
research team at Osaka University, which in 2015 successfully tested what they called the 
“Laser for Fast Ignition Experiments” (LFEX) and claimed to be the “world’s most 
powerful laser.”199 Although LFEX is currently not designed for a weapon system, it is 
nonetheless a scientific accomplishment that Japan might build upon for future projects. 
It proves that Japan has some of the leading researchers in this field.  
Laser development is still in its early stages, and major problems and limitations 
do exist. These include “line-of-sight dependence, requirement of finite dwell time, 
problems due to atmospheric attenuation and turbulence, and ineffectiveness against 
hardened structures.”
200
 Effects from the weather are a particular concern because the 
laser’s ability to focus its beam can be degraded by debris and weather conditions. 
Finally, the United Nations Convention on Certain Weapons Protocol IV prohibits the 
use of laser weapons for the purposes of blinding an enemy.201 This makes it illegal for 
use in ground warfare between troops on the battlefield. The use of lasers is therefore, 
only applicable to major kinetic defense platforms such as aircraft, ships, and large 
ground vehicles. Further R&D will most likely flesh out some of these technical 
limitations in the future. The advancement of laser technology is still well within the 
progressive stages with many more milestones yet to be achieved. The good news is that 
Japan is among the leading nations working towards this progress. Even though there are 
many uncertainties about the future of laser weapons, I argue that this technology, at the 
very least, has potential for Japan’s future defense export business because it is rapidly 
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being developed for military purposes. Japan’s government should continually commit to 
the advancement of laser through investment and through utilizing its top researchers. 
3. Electronic Niche Components 
As this thesis identified early on, Japan’s industries will have difficulty competing 
internationally exporting weapons platforms like aircraft, tanks, and ships because the 
U.S. and other established countries already control the lion’s share of the market. 
Instead, Japan should focus on small niche electronic components where it maintains a 
comparative advantage, such as capacitors, resistors, sensors, and semiconductors. This 
makes sense considering that Japan’s electronic industry ranks third in the world.202 One 
example is missile navigational guidance sensors. In 2014, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry 
officially marketed this technology to the U.S. to be incorporated into PAC-3 air defense 
missile.203 Also, as identified in Chapter One, navigational gyros for missiles are no 
longer produced in the U.S.,204 which provides an opening for Japan to capture this 
industry. Another promising niche component and one that Japan dominates in, is the 
“complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS),” which Herman identifies as an 
export business that will “grow … to more than $16 billion by 2020, and that the range of 
military as well as commercial applications will grow with the size and flexibility of 
CMOS technology.”205 Electronic components will become more prominent in the future 
as weapons become more sophisticated. Japan has the opportunity to be the leading 
exporter of crucial components for ballistic missile defenses and possibly other platforms. 
                                                 
202 “Japan-Semiconductors,” U.S. Commercial Service, last modified June 28, 2016, 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Japan-Semiconductors. 
203 “Japan OKs First Major Military Tech Deals since Arms Export Ban Eased,” Japan Times, July 
18, 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/18/national/japan-supply-arms-parts-u-s-sensor-
technology-u-k/. 
204 Yamaguchi and Kurtenbach, “Japan’s Ambitions For Defense Exports.” 
205 Herman, “The Awakening Giant,” 14. 
 77 
4. Robotics Industry 
Japan possesses the world’s most advanced robotics industry and is also the 
world’s largest supplier of robots.206 The scope of its program is very diverse, with many 
different types of robots being developed in both the industrial and service sector. The 
EU-Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation breaks it down into three areas: 1) “Industrial 
robots for the manufacturing industry”; 2) “Service robots for industrial and personal 
use”; and 3) “RoboTech – Components for the Robot Industry.”207 These include 
advanced technologies like artificial human robot helpers, sophisticated machineries in 
the industry assembly lines, and specialized precision components. Japan’s robotics 
market “is expected to almost double in size to 2.85 trillion JPY by 2020.”208 Figure 8 
illustrates the enormous growth projected in the next couple of decades. Also, as depicted 
in Figure 9, Japan recently implemented a plan for what it called the “Robot Revolution,” 
a strategy that injects robotics into all forms of modern technology.209 These trends 
indicate that robotics will eventually be infused in all aspects of Japanese society. 
                                                 
206 Anthony Fensom, “Japan’s Robot Revolution: As the Nation Grapples with a Shrinking 
Workforce, are Robotics the Solution?” Diplomat, July 10, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/japans-
robot-revolution/. 




208 Van der Weeen, “Robotics in Japan,” 3. 
209 Fensom, “Japan’s Robot Revolution.” 
 78 
Figure 8.  Japan’s Robot Market Projection210 
 
Figure 9.  Information on Japan’s Robotic Revolution211 
 
                                                 
210  Source: Fensom, “Japan’s Robot Revolution.” 
211 Source: “Summary of Japan’s Robot Strategy: It’s Vision, Strategy, and Action Plan,” Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, January 23, 2015, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/
0123_01c.pdf. 
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The robotics industry could also play a significant role in developing high-tech 
weapon systems because the JSDF’s strength in the future will depend on the quality of 
its defense equipment. The possibilities of military applications of robotics are endless. 
Herman writes, “above all, Japanese expertise in highly sophisticated robotics could 
provide ideal platforms for AI developments in the future sector.”212 While the idea that 
future warfare will be fought using artificial intelligence is often associated with popular 
science, it is not far removed from reality, as Honda has already developed a humanoid 
robot called Asimo that can perform a wide array of simple tasks.213 There are many 
other types of humanoids already being used. 
The robotics industry is also a viable solution for two of the problems identified in 
this thesis: a future labor shortage due to declining population and troubles in the defense 
export market. For the defense export market, if Japan’s R&D teams can successfully 
infuse robotics into modern defense equipment, it may provide Japan with a unique brand 
that every nation would want to purchase. For example, if building a robot soldier is truly 
possible in the future––one that possesses all the combat skills of human soldiers––it 
could be a revolutionary game-changer in warfare. By all indications, Japan is the world 
leader in making this concept a reality. Although these goals will no doubt have their 
share of challenges, they nonetheless provide a strategic vision for the future that could 
be profitable for Japan’s international export industry. Currently, the robotics industry 
has massive support from hundreds of companies, and annuals sales are projected to 
increase to “2.4 trillion yen by 2020.214
 
It is so important that Abe has reached out to its 
industries, exhorting them in a speech to “spread the use of robotics from large-scale 
factories to every corner of our economy and society.”215 
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5. Japan’s Space Program 
Japan’s space program is very well established and ranks high in the world in 
R&D, budget, and technological advancement. The government continues to invest 
heavily in space because it is vital to projecting national power both militarily and 
economically, while providing the nation with international prestige. As the lead 
government organization overseeing all space activities, the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA) maintains diverse programs that span into the areas of satellites, launch 
vehicles, human spaceflight, research, and so on.216 Space is the epitome of the dual-use 
technology policy to which Japan is committed, because it has an equally significant 
application to military and civilian technology. Japan’s space program is thus an area of 
enormous potential in the commercial export business. Pekkanan and Kallender-Umezu 
writes, “because of the unusual prevalence of dual-use technology in the space industry, 
this could be economically profitable and, as it turned out, politically attractive and 
legitimately possible over time as Japan faced rising external security challenges.”217  
One area where Japan’s space program can compete internationally is in the 
launch business with its prominent H-2 series space launch vehicles. The H-2 rocket 
program that was successfully developed in the 1990s gradually evolved to the 
development of the more capable H-2A by the early 2000s.218 Further upgrades led to the 
H-IIB rocket, which has greater payload capacity, and according to JAXA official Jiro 
Kochiyama, “they not only enable us to carry out national missions such as the launch of 
earth observation or navigation satellites and the transportation of supplies to the 
International Space Station (ISS) by the H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV), but also allow us 
to launch the multiple satellites simultaneously.”219 Both the H-2A and H-2B launch 
vehicles are competitors on the world stage because they are advanced and reliable, and, 
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therefore, have the potential to expand Japan’s space launch service. Opportunities exist 
especially in Southeast Asia, because some of these nations are relatively new players in 
space and are eager to advance their own programs. Since Japan’s space program is more 
advanced and established, Southeast Asian countries may possibly look to JAXA as the 
delivery service of choice. Reliability is a huge factor to drawing in customers in the 
space business. According to a MHI representative, “clients attach the greatest 
importance to ‘track record and reliability.’”220 Japan’s H-2A rocket does indeed pass 
this test because 97 percent of its launches have been successful.221 
One of the major challenges to Japan’s space launch program is the cost both in 
labor and material. JAXA is, however, making progress in this area. In an effort to reduce 
the cost of the H-2 program, Moltz describes JAXA’s newest projects, including the 
larger H-3 rocket and the small booster program Epsilon, which he holds “can be ordered 
and launched with short lead times, making it more flexible for commercial 
customers.”222 Additionally, JAXA is developing an even smaller rocket called SS-520, 
which has a produced by the company Canon. The SS-520 may reduce launch costs even 
further by using an alternate fuel source.223 Figure 10 provides details/specifications on 
Japan’s rocket launch program. Although it is not without challenges, Japan’s space 
launch business is one area that might alleviate the defense export problem described 
above. 
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Figure 10.  Comparison of Japan’s Rocket Launch Systems224 
 
 
Space satellites may also open the door for Japan’s commercial export business. 
The space industry has already made progress in this area. For example, as early as 2002 
the industrial giant Melco already had 30 different satellites in the international 
market.225 Also, Dunphy points out by 2016, “Japanese delegation[s] consisting of 
METI, MOFA, NEC and several ICT companies ha[d] already started approaching 
countries in South East Asia, Africa and the Middle East” and received order requests 
from Vietnam for their satellite.226 Although this was paid for by the Official 
Development Assistance department of MOFA, it nonetheless indicates a potential 
market opportunity in the future. Another example is the Tokyo-based company NEC’s 
continued development of the Advanced Satellite with New System Architecture for 
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Observation (ASNARO), which includes various versions of the NX-series satellites.227 
NEC has strong aspirations to grow its commercial export business. According to 
executive specialist Toshiaki Ogawa, “we aim to double our annual space-related 
revenues from about 50 billion yen now to 100 billion yen in 2020.”228 Ogawa also 
points out that the NX satellite caters to the needs of emerging countries because it 
provides the ideal amount of power and is also more cost effective.229 The Diet should 
continually invest in the R&D and commercialization of space satellites because it is 
another area where the country possesses a comparative advantage. Like other space 
programs, the research and development of satellites is heavily subsidized by the 
government, and, given the fiscal troubles mentioned above, funding for this program 
may be a challenge in the future. Also, like many of the weapon systems produced by 
defense industries, most satellite sales thus far have been to the Japanese government.  
The issue of legitimacy pointed out by Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu is an 
important one, because Japan’s defense modernization efforts, including the lifting of the 
arms export ban, are often viewed in a negative light by the public. However, the space 
program is more associated with civilian scientific research or commercial services, as 
opposed to having a military connotation, and this gives legitimacy to both the 
government and industry when exported on the international market. While space 
projects are often supportive of military capabilities such as ISR, ICBMs, and missile 
defenses, Japan’s space program for the most part has a non-militaristic reputation. None 
of the core projects/missions listed by JAXA mention any association to military 
weaponry or related support systems. The space program, therefore, offers Japan the 
opportunity to build on its military capabilities without public accusation, something 
identified in Chapter Two as a major barrier to meeting NDPG objectives. Space projects, 
by and large, do legitimately have peaceful scientific and commercial objectives.  
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Finally, large portions of Japan’s space program have been built indigenously. 
Japanese firms will develop many of its future acquisition projects domestically. As the 
space program continues to grow, so too will the industry’s capacity for kokusanka. The 
space program therefore addresses two major problems identified in this thesis. Some 
keynote projects in the works include the Quasi-Zenith Satellite and the G-Spatial 
Information System, designed to be the next generation in GPS/navigational 
technology.230 Japan’s space program is unique in that it encompasses all elements of 
society except the military, including industry, academia, bureaucracy, and other 
organizations that contribute to its advancement. Although it is not without challenges, 
the program is world class and continually evolving. It is a valuable source that will 
continue to strengthen the country by contributing dual-use technologies. 
Figure 11.  Scope of Japan’s Space Program231 
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231 Source: Dunphy, “Space Industry Business,” 28. 
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D. BUREAUCRATIC REFORM 
Given the deficiencies inside Japan’s bureaucracy identified above, reform is 
needed. Leaders within the ministries must transition to a more progressive approach to 
doing business. First, as identified in Chapter Two, Japan’s decision-making can improve 
by incorporating the opinions of outside non-government experts, including those from 
academia, think tanks, and industry. Ironically, Japan’s space program has an 
organizational structure that fits this model. As shown in Figure 11, the space program is 
a mix of government ministries/agencies, aerospace companies, universities, and non-
profit organizations. It is my assessment that the ministries should follow this model. 
This is not to suggest that government should completely restructure the ministries. This 
is not feasible. However, more can be done to collaborate with outside groups so that 
ministry officials can gain an alternative perspective before making decisions. In 
addition, as already described above, Japan’s ministries would function better if they 
were to follow Sugai advocacy for a “knowledge management system that can utilize all 
knowledge that the acquisition workforce has accumulated as explicit and tacit 
knowledge.”232 Although it is unclear whether the government is headed in this direction, 
or if it even realizes this deficiency, stove piping and reluctance to share information are 
two of the weakest characteristics of the government. 
Last, Japan’s bureaucrats receive a disproportionate amount of prestige. While the 
bureaucracy is a critically important job that must attract high-quality candidates, Japan’s 
culture puts too much prominence on top government positions, thereby reducing the 
importance of other vital occupations. Jones writes that bureaucrats receive an enormously 
generous retirement package, earn salaries much higher than those working for top firms, 
and enjoy other perks such as a three-year maternity leave.233 While bureaucrats deserve 
recognition for their service, and are entitled to a pension, other NGOs also deserve 
monetary bonuses, subsidiaries, and recognition. Particularly, it would serve the nation well 
to increase the wages for JSDF personnel and to provide them bonuses. Such efforts are 
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necessary to attract the best and the brightest into military service–and it might be more 
feasible to make the military portion of the public sector more attractive than to do the 
same for the private sector or to make the bureaucracy less so. 
E. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
The changing security environment in East Asia, as shown by recent events, 
confirms Japan’s need to execute the objectives outlined in the NDPG. This thesis 
formulated a comprehensive list of challenges that Japan must contend with in meeting 
those objectives. In spite of these challenges, Japan is still one of the most capable and 
advanced militaries in the world, and one that is supported by a world-class defense 
industry and well-functioning government.  
As these strengths and challenges combine, the ultimate question is whether, how, 
and when (if ever) Japan can accomplish the NDPG objectives. The research above 
suggests there is reason for both optimism and pessimism. Militarily, there are some 
doubts as to whether the SDF will act decisively in a timely manner. Even though policy 
has changed to allow for CSD, there is still the stipulation that national survival must be 
in jeopardy. This leaves too much room for interpretation and for hesitation by SDF 
commanders and is exacerbated by the fact that permission is required from civilian 
leadership before acting. However, Abe and the LDP seem to be chipping away at 
obstacles to full revision of Article 9, which, if it occurs, could make the rules of 
engagement clear. Of course, opposition from more pacifist sectors of society will be a 
huge influence on the Diet and Cabinet. Japan’s anti-militaristic culture adds much 
pessimism to this mix, although further security vulnerabilities might potentially reverse 
this trend. Furthermore, the joint U.S.-SDF military capability is still in the building 
stages, with joint exercises and other collaborate activities projected to increase 
frequency. Operationally, there is reason to be optimistic about future capabilities, 
because the alliance seems to be strengthening. However, much more time is needed for 
all these initiatives to solidify. 
Finally, this thesis has taken a fairly pessimistic tone concerning Japan’s inability 
to indigenously develop its own weapons systems (kokusanka). This is obviously a major 
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long-term challenge, but is another area in which Japan is making progress. The 
establishment of the ATLA and the trend towards greater technological collaboration 
with the U.S. is a positive sign. However, leaders must continually assess the budget 
situation, as well as establish and strengthen their position in the global export market.  
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